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I. INTRODUCTION
As European Catholics flowed into Wisconsin during the mid-19th 
century, they established parochial schools as part of an effort to pre-
serve their religion and culture in their new homeland.  Many resisted 
old-stock Wisconsinites’ vision of the state’s public schools as common 
 * Adjunct Professor and Schoone Visiting Fellow, Marquette University Law School; At-
torney, DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C., Madison, Wisconsin.  This Article is adapted from 
WISCONSIN AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN LAW (University of Wisconsin Press, forthcom-
ing), which was written under the auspices of the Schoone Fellowship.  The author gratefully 
acknowledges the Fellowship’s and Marquette Law School’s support of this project. 
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924 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:923 
ground for educating and assimilating Wisconsin children of all back-
grounds.1  Over the course of the next century, Wisconsin lawmakers 
rejected parochial school supporters’ efforts to obtain state financial 
support2 but in 1961, supporters finally triumphed when the legislature 
agreed to fund busing of parochial as well as public-school students.3
Their victory was short-lived, however: later that year, Wisconsin’s su-
preme court struck down the funding law as a breach of the constitu-
tionally-required separation between church and state.4
Supporters had hoped they would have at least some judicial allies 
in an era when Catholics were increasingly finding their political and 
legal voice, but they failed to take into account the court’s culture of 
uniformity.  The justices’ backgrounds were similar:  all were men who 
had risen from relatively modest origins and had spent most of their 
lives in law and government.5 Dissent was not unknown among the jus-
tices but they strove to avoid it.6  Since the late 19th century the court 
had honored the old-stock assimilationist vision of education and had 
consistently rejected efforts to subsidize parochial schools.7  The justices 
were not about to change course now. 
But during the next three decades the culture of assimilation and 
consensus eroded badly.  Voters overrode the court’s decision in 1967 
by amending the state constitution to authorize public funding of paro-
chial busing;8 they then turned their attention to racial assimilation in 
the Milwaukee public school system (MPS).  By 1990 many Wisconsin-
ites, black and white alike, had concluded that school integration was a 
failure and in the spring of that year the legislature struck another blow 
1. See SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 558–65 
(1972); ROBERT MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL 69–74, 87–89 (1970). 
2. See Costigan v. Hall, 249 Wis. 94, 23 N.W.2d 495 (1946); State ex rel. Van Straten v. 
Milquet, 180 Wis. 109, 192 N.W. 392 (1923). 
3. WIS. STAT. § 40.53(1) (1962).
4. See State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962). 
5. As to the justices’ religion and background, see PORTRAITS OF JUSTICE: THE WISCONSIN
SUPREME COURT’S FIRST 150 YEARS (Trina E. Gray et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003), 57–58 (Timothy 
Brown), 59–60 (George Currie), 72 (Thomas Fairchild), 63–64 (E. Harold Hallows), 64–65 (Wil-
liam Dieterich), 73 (Myron Gordon), 65–66 (Horace Wilkie). 
6. In 1940, 92% of the court’s decisions were unanimous; in 1960 the figure was 88%.  
Figures in author’s possession; see infra note 254 and accompanying text. 
7. State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dist. No. 8 of Edgerton, 76 Wis. 2d 177, 44 N.W. 
967 (1890); Costigan, 249 Wis. 94; State ex rel. Van Straten, 180 Wis. 109. 
8. J. Res. 46, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1965); J. Res. 13, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1967); 
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 1967). 
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against assimilation by enacting the nation’s first school-voucher law, 
providing public subsidies to parents and students who wished to leave 
MPS for private schools.9  Two years later, a challenge to the law reached 
a supreme court that had changed dramatically since 1962.  Judicial con-
sensus was declining—by the end of the 1990s the court would divide 
in more than half of its cases10—and the court had also become less mon-
olithic in other ways.  It now included Shirley Abrahamson, who had 
become Wisconsin’s first female justice in 1976, and William Bablitch 
and Louis Ceci, former legislators whose perspectives had been heavily 
influenced by their time in the political arena.11
In Davis v. Grover (1992) the court narrowly upheld the school 
voucher law, and it also showcased the demise of the culture of consen-
sus.12  Both the majority and the dissenters viewed Davis as a victory of 
individual choice over assimilationism; the contentiousness of their lan-
guage mirrored the political controversy that had surrounded the law’s 
enactment and marked an end to a core consensus-era value, namely 
circumspection of language and avoidance of personal attacks.  Justice 
Ceci, who was part of the majority, bluntly attacked MPS as a failure 
and urged the dissenters to “give choice a chance!”13  The dissenters 
fired back: Justice Bablitch labeled Ceci’s opinion “totally inappropriate 
and judicially indefensible,”14 and Justice Abrahamson criticized the 
majority for “permit[ting] the legislature to subvert the unifying, de-
mocratizing purpose of public education.”15  The majority responded to 
Abrahamson by praising school choice as an “illustration of Wisconsin’s 
innovation and willingness to . . . further improve the quality of educa-
tion and life.”16  In 1995 the legislature allowed use of vouchers in paro-
chial schools for the first time, but opponents’ hopes that the court 
would strike down the law based on its 1962 ruling were soon dashed.  
9. 1989 Wis. Act 336. 
10. In 1980, 75% of the court’s decisions were unanimous; in 2000 and 2010 the figures 
decreased to 47% and 18% respectively.  See infra note 254 and accompanying text. 
11. See PORTRAITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 78 (Ceci), 81 (Abrahamson), 82 (Bablitch); 
see also THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 1 (Roger K. Newman ed., 
2009), 1 (Abrahamson). 
12. Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992). 
13. Id. at 546 (Ceci, J., concurring). 
14. Id. at 565 n.1 (Bablitch, J., dissenting). 
15. Id. at 562 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
16. Id. at 512 n.2. 
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The old rule of strict separation between church and state, said the ma-
jority, had been superseded by a new Wisconsin “tradition[] . . . [—]ac-
cord[ing] parents the primary role in decisions regarding the education 
and upbringing of their children.”17
The Wisconsin court’s shift mirrored a larger American shift away 
from the traditional view of liberty, a view that tolerated divergence 
only within a finite universe of acceptable discourse,18 toward a view of 
liberty as “expressive individualism” that eliminated the boundaries of 
that universe and promoted Americans’ right to shape their own lives 
and views without limit.19  In the words of one observer, expressive in-
dividualism caused “conceptions of human nature that . . . had been 
thick with context, social circumstance, institutions and history [to] 
g[i]ve way to conceptions of human nature that stress[ ] choice, agency, 
performance, and desire.”20  The shift first became apparent during the 
turbulent 1960s and 1970s, and it has been a force behind nearly every 
important social movement of the past half century.21
Expressive individualism has proven to have a darker side, one 
which has “conjured up . . . something smaller, more voluntaristic, frac-
tured, easier to exit, and guarded from others.”22  Since the 1960s many 
Americans have shifted away from communal forms of activity such as 
churchgoing and participation in social and civic organizations; they 
now spend much of their time alone or interacting with small groups, 
usually of like-minded people, leading historian Daniel Rodgers to label 
the modern era the “Age of Fracture.”23
17. Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 879, 578 N.W.2d 602, 621 (1998), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 997 (1998). 
18. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 12–13 
(1993).
19. JAMES T. PATTERSON, RESTLESS GIANT: THE UNITED STATES FROM WATERGATE TO 
BUSH V. GORE 47–52, 69–75 (2005); FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 12–13. 
20. DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 3 (2011). 
21. PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 42–49; RODGERS, supra note 20, at 4–8. 
22. RODGERS, supra note 20, at 220. 
23. See PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 59–63, 75–85, 167–70; ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING
ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 173–80, 283–85 (2000).  The 
causes of this fracture cannot be neatly identified but they include increasing distrust of gov-
ernment, first generated by the Vietnam War (1963–75) and by the Watergate scandal that led 
to President Richard Nixon’s resignation (1973–74), and the transition away from a mid-cen-
tury economy dominated by large corporations and unions to a more changeable, less pre-
dictable economy in which wealth and success depend more on individual initiative than on 
teamwork.  The electronic revolution that began in the late 1970s has also been a contributor: 
Much of the time that Americans formerly spent communicating face-to-face is now spent 
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Expressive individualism has produced an increasingly polarized 
nation: Americans with similar education and income levels increas-
ingly share each other’s political and cultural viewpoints, seek each 
other out and have minimal interaction with people at other levels.24
Expressive individualism has also “etched a vivid trail of anger and 
memory”25 and elicited a powerful conservative reaction that has influ-
enced modern American society fully as much as the forces it opposes.  
Modern conservatism has many sides but its common hallmarks in-
clude a desire for clear codes of morality and behavior; a basic skepti-
cism of the value of social change; and a fear that toleration of deviance 
from traditional mores will lead to irretrievable loss of all ideals.26
This Article uses Wisconsin as a lens to examine ways in which the 
struggle between expressive individualism and its opponents has 
shaped modern American state law.  Wisconsin is a useful lens because 
it has made important contributions to legal expressive individualism, 
most notably by adopting the nation’s first voucher system, and because 
modern Wisconsin law has reflected the course of other struggles over 
expressive individualism. 
The Article begins by examining the role that state lawmakers in 
Wisconsin and elsewhere played in the meteoric rise of gay and lesbian 
rights after 1970, an unambiguous triumph for expressive individualism 
and perhaps its most important contribution to American law.27  The 
Article then turns to several fields in which the struggle between expres-
sive individualism and its opponents continues.  First, during recent 
decades Wisconsin and other states have established new constitutional 
rights promoting individual expression including the right to bear arms, 
to hunt and fish, and to gamble, but other state constitutional amend-
ments have been used to promote modern conservative values, particu-
larly defense-of-marriage (DOMA) amendments enacted in order to 
block legalization of gay marriage and amendments restricting use of 
sitting alone with a computer, communicating with others remotely and often anonymously.  
Id.
24. NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 66–68 (2010); PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 
81–83, 167–70. 
25. RODGERS, supra note 20, at 4. 
26. See RED AND BLUE NATION? CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S
POLARIZED POLITICS 1–48, 119–222 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006); CAHN &
CARBONE, supra note 24, at 62–65. 
27. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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928 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:923 
languages other than English in official settings.  The Article examines 
the historical origins and the modern course of each amendment move-
ment.28
Second, the Article examines expressive individualism as mani-
fested in the voucher movement and in courts’ increasing preferment of 
parental over public authority.  Assimilationists have given ground in 
these fields but they continue stoutly to oppose voucher programs and 
other individualist reforms; the Article explains how, in the end, the fate 
of voucher programs in Wisconsin and elsewhere may turn on varia-
tions in state constitutional provisions regarding education.29  Third, the 
Article examines the struggle in Wisconsin and other states over laws 
limiting women’s access to abortion.30  It explains how abortion oppo-
nents, after failing in their quest to overturn Roe v. Wade,31 turned to in-
direct legal restrictions which have enjoyed much success but continue 
to meet with steady opposition, and it examines the evolution of legal 
boundaries between permissible and impermissible restriction of 
women’s ability to control abortion decisions.32
The Article concludes by examining how expressive individualism 
has penetrated the culture of state courts.  The decline of judicial con-
sensus has not been limited to Wisconsin: rates of dissent and rhetorical 
vitriol have risen within many state supreme courts.33  Since the late 
1970s a number of state judges and courts, including Wisconsin’s 
Shirley Abrahamson, have espoused a “new federalism” doctrine which 
holds that state courts should express their individualism by reading 
state constitutions expansively to protect and expand civil rights inde-
pendent of federal constitutional precedent; however, the doctrine has 
elicited much popular and judicial opposition.34  Expressive individual-
ism clearly has been the central theme of late 20th century and early 21st 
century American law; how long that will remain the case, and how per-
manent a mark expressive individualism will leave on American law, 
remain to be seen. 
28. See infra notes 42, 44, 80–84, 87, and accompanying text. 
29. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
30. See infra notes 219–20, 236–38, 241–46, and accompanying text. 
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
32. See infra notes 219–20, 236–38, 241–46, and accompanying text. 
33. See infra note 250 and accompanying text. 
34. See infra notes 267–71, 281–82, and accompanying text. 
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II. INDIVIDUALISM ASCENDANT: THE GAY MARRIAGE REVOLUTION
Mid-20th-century law reflected prevailing social attitudes toward 
gays.  Most Americans considered gay lifestyles distasteful at best; gay 
sex was subject to prosecution under the sodomy laws in force in nearly 
every state and many believed that gays should be barred from congre-
gating in bars and other public places,35 although in the 1950s Califor-
nia’s supreme court and several eastern state courts held that constitu-
tional rights of association protected gays as much as other Americans.36
Following the 1969 Stonewall incident, in which a police raid on a New 
York City gay bar triggered one of the first mass protests and expres-
sions of gay pride, a movement began to expand gays’ civil rights.37  In 
1981, Wisconsin became the first state to prohibit employment discrim-
ination based on sexual orientation;38 by 2010, twenty-one states had fol-
lowed suit and governors in nine other states had issued orders prohib-
iting such discrimination in government employment.39  The road to 
social and legal acceptance was long.  Early antidiscrimination ordi-
nances elicited strong reactions and some successful repeal efforts by 
opponents, but reform continued to inch forward in other areas and 
public opinion gradually softened.40
Gay activists envisioned a gay-marriage campaign as early as 1970, 
although they were divided over the wisdom of pursuing that goal so 
early in the new movement.41  During the early 1970s three state su-
preme courts rejected arguments that constitutional equal-protection 
clauses required that marriage rights be extended to homosexual as well 
as heterosexual couples; national gay-rights groups then counseled 
against further challenges until public opinion became more gay-
35. See WALTER FRANK, LAW AND THE GAY RIGHTS STORY: THE LONG SEARCH FOR EQUAL
JUSTICE IN A DIVIDED DEMOCRACY 8–20 (2014). 
36.  See Kerma Rest. Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 233 N.E.2d 833 (N.Y. 1967); One Eleven 
Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 235 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1967); Stoumen 
v. Reilly, 234 P.2d 969 (Cal. 1951). 
37. FRANK, supra note 35, at 28–44. 
38. 1981 Wis. Act 112. 
39. JEROME HUNT, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS ACTION FUND, A STATE-BY-STATE
EXAMINATION OF NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND POLICIES, 3–4, 22–80 (2012). 
40. FRANK, supra note 35, at 44–48, 75–77. 
41. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation Has Ad-
vanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93 B.U. L. REV. 275, 281–82 (2013). 
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friendly.42  In the early 1990s Hawaiian activists mounted a new chal-
lenge and in Baehr v. Lewin (1993), Hawaii’s supreme court surprised the 
nation by holding based on the state’s equal-protection clause (which it 
concluded was broader than the federal clause) that denial of the right 
of marriage to gay couples constituted unconstitutional gender-based 
discrimination.43 Baehr went too far for most Americans: between 1993 
and 2008 more than half the states, including Wisconsin, enacted de-
fense-of-marriage constitutional amendments (DOMAs) barring gay 
marriage and prohibiting recognition of gay marriages performed in 
other states.44  The DOMAs varied in scope: ten referred only to mar-
riage;45 sixteen, including Wisconsin’s, referred to marriage and civil 
unions;46 and four broadly prohibited all relationships containing any 
elements of marriage.47
Although the activists who filed suit in Baehr failed in their quest to 
marry, they succeeded better than they knew.  Hawaii’s supreme court 
had opened the door to hope that arguments for a constitutional right 
of gay marriage might prevail someday, and movement leaders began 
to cultivate political support in other states where they believed gay 
marriage might have a chance.48  Hawaii’s legislature opened the door 
a bit more: in 1998 it enacted the nation’s first domestic partnership law 
42. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 
(Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); FRANK, supra note 35, 51–
55.
43. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); see also Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 
(Haw. 1999); Baehr v. Miike, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997). 
44. DOMAs were enacted in Alaska (1998); Nevada and Nebraska (2000); Michigan, Ar-
kansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, Missouri, Mis-
sissippi, Montana, and Oregon (2004); Kansas and Texas (2005); South Dakota, Virginia, Al-
abama, Idaho, South Carolina, Wisconsin, Colorado, and Tennessee (2006); Florida, Arizona, 
and California (2008); and North Carolina (2012). See Research Guides: Same-Sex Marriage Laws,
MORITZ COLL. OF L., http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/library/samesexmarriagelaws.php
[https://perma.cc/LDS9-MWJK] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
45. Those of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, Ne-
vada, Oregon, and Tennessee. See id.
46. Those of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin.  
See id.
47. Those of Michigan, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Virginia.  See id.
48. Eskridge, supra note 41, at 282–85. 
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extending certain inheritance rights, hospital visitation rights, and gov-
ernment benefits to registered partners.49  A year later, Vermont’s su-
preme court opened the door still wider: in Baker v. State (1999) it held 
that the Vermont constitution’s “common benefits” clause mandated 
that gay couples receive the “common benefit, protection, and security 
that Vermont law provides opposite-sex marriage couples.”50  The court 
rejected opponents’ arguments that excluding gay couples from the ben-
efits of marriage promoted the state’s interest in encouraging procrea-
tion, noting that childbearing was not a requirement of marriage and 
that many married couples were childless.51  It stopped short of requir-
ing that gay couples be allowed to marry, but it made clear that they 
must be given all the legal benefits of marriage.52  The legislature com-
plied by enacting a civil-unions law in 2000.53
Efforts in Vermont to overturn Baker and the civil-unions law 
through enactment of a DOMA failed,54 and another turning point soon 
arrived: in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (2003) Massachu-
setts’s supreme court held by a 4-3 vote that its state constitution’s 
equal-protection clause required that the title as well as the incidents of 
marriage be extended to gay couples.55  Vermont’s justices had phrased 
their decision in soft terms, as “a recognition of our common human-
ity,”56 but Chief Justice Margaret Marshall and others in the Massachu-
setts majority were more hard-edged.  Marshall denounced opposition 
to gay marriage as being “rooted in persistent prejudices”; the state con-
stitution, she said, “cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tol-
erate them.”57  The Goodridge dissenters laid out the basic arguments that 
gay-marriage opponents would raise throughout the ensuing decade of 
litigation: in addition to arguing that confining marriage to heterosexual 
49. Act effective July 8, 1997, H.B. 118, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws, 1211, 1211–12. 
50. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999).  Article I, § 7 of the Vermont constitution 
provides that “government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, 
and security of the people, nation or community, and not for the particular emolument or 
advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons.” VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, § 7. 
51. Baker, 744 A.2d at 882. 
52. Id. at 884–87. 
53. Act effective July 1, 2000, H. 847, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72–88. 
54. Eskridge, supra note 41, at 285–86. 
55. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); see also Opinions of 
the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004) (advising the Massachusetts legislature 
that a civil-union law would not suffice to comply with Goodridge’s holding). 
56. Baker, 744 A.2d at 889. 
57. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968. 
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couples encouraged procreation,58 they argued that the court was 
“transform[ing] its role as protector of individual rights into the role of 
creator of rights” that had never before been discerned in Massachu-
setts’s constitution.59  More practically, they stressed that gay marriage 
could not last without popular support and, thus, should be achieved 
through the political process rather than judicial fiat.60
Efforts in the Massachusetts legislature to overturn Goodridge
through a constitutional amendment failed narrowly,61 but the case pro-
vided fuel for a new wave of DOMAs in other states.62  In Wisconsin, 
constitutional amendments must be approved by two consecutive leg-
islatures and then ratified by voters.63  The legislature approved a 
DOMA in 2003 and again in 2005.64  After a vigorous campaign in which 
supporters averred that the amendment’s only purpose was to limit the 
institution of marriage to heterosexual couples and that it was not in-
tended to deny other legal rights to gay Wisconsinites, voters ratified it 
by a 59%-41% margin in late 2006.65
Goodridge also gave rise to a wave of lawsuits, mostly in the North-
east, seeking judicial declarations of a constitutional right of gay mar-
riage.66  They produced mixed results.67  In 2006 New Jersey’s supreme 
court followed Baker and held that the state’s equal protection and due 
58. Id. at 1002 n.34 (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
59. Id. at 974 (Spina, J., dissenting). 
60. Id. at 990 (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
61. H. JOURNAL, 183d Sess. 1308–11 (Mass. 2004). 
62. See Eskridge, supra note 41, at 302–03. 
63. WIS. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
64. Id. art. XIII, § 13; J. Res. 29, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2004); S. J. Res. 30, 97th Leg.,  
Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005). 
65. See Appling v. Walker, 2014 WI 96, ¶¶ 22–37, 358 Wis. 2d 132, 853 N.W.2d 888.  The 
vote was 1,264,310 in favor of the amendment and 862,924 against.  STATE OF WISCONSIN,
BLUE BOOK 2009–2010, at 240 (2009). 
66. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Morrison v. Sad-
ler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Shulman v. Attorney Gen., 850 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 
2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
67. Alaska and Oregon voters enacted DOMAs that overturned early decisions by 
lower-level courts in those states holding that their state constitutions mandated marriage or 
civil unions for gay couples. See Brause v. State Dep’t of Health & Social Servs., 21 P.3d 357 
(Alaska 2001); Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (D. Alaska 1998); Revised 
Limited Judgment, Li v. State, 2004 WL 4963162 (Or. Cir. Ct. 2004), vacated, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 
2005).
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process clauses mandated civil unions; three dissenters would have fol-
lowed Goodridge.68 The supreme courts of New York (2006) and Mary-
land (2007) refused by narrow margins to read a right to gay marriage 
into their state’s constitutions69 but in 2008 a closely-divided Connecti-
cut Supreme Court followed Goodridge.70  A wave of legal challenges to 
state DOMAs also began in 2006. Challengers argued that the DOMAs 
contravened federal and state equal-protection and due-process clauses; 
the Washington, Ohio, and Michigan supreme courts rejected such chal-
lenges71 but California’s and Iowa’s supreme courts struck down their 
states’ DOMA statutes in 2008 and 2009 respectively, based on their 
state constitutions’ equal-protection clauses.72 Both decisions triggered 
backlashes: California voters responded by approving a DOMA73 and 
in 2010 Iowa voters ousted three justices who had voted for gay mar-
riage.74
The backlash in California unexpectedly opened the final, federal 
phase of the legal debate over gay marriage.  After California’s supreme 
court rejected a challenge to the state’s new DOMA,75 California gay-
marriage advocates turned for the first time to the federal equal-protec-
tion clause and the federal courts.  In Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010) fed-
eral judge Vaughn Walker conducted a lengthy, nationally-publicized 
trial to determine whether there were facts to support gay-marriage op-
ponents’ arguments that limiting marriage to heterosexual couples pro-
moted procreation and children’s welfare.  After hearing all the evi-
dence Walker issued a detailed, methodical opinion concluding that 
opponents had not proven their case and that California’s DOMA vio-
lated the federal equal-protection clause.76  His decision was upheld on 
appeal; the U.S. Supreme Court then vacated it but declined to address 
the merits, holding only that the gay-marriage opponents who had 
68. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). 
69. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d 1; Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007). 
70. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 457–60, 482. 
71. Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor, 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008); State v. Carswell, 
872 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007); Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006). 
72. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 
(Iowa 2009). 
73. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (amended 2008). 
74. See A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
2010, at A1. 
75. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
76. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 671 F.3d 1052 
(9th Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
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joined as parties to defend the DOMA after California’s attorney general 
declined to do so did not have standing.77  Gay-marriage litigation then 
steadily shifted from state to federal courts, nearly all of which agreed 
with Judge Walker that gay couples had the right to marry under the 
federal equal-protection clause.78  Walker’s decision played a crucial 
role in the shift but so did rapidly-changing popular attitudes: begin-
ning in 2009 opinion polls consistently began to show more support 
than opposition to gay marriage, and in 2012 President Obama formally 
endorsed it.79  Federal courts upheld gay couples’ right to marriage in 
three states in 2013,80 twenty-four states in 201481 and three states in 
2015;82 the New Mexico and New Jersey supreme courts did the same,83
leaving only a handful of states in which gay marriage remained ille-
gal.84  The tide of change reached Wisconsin in 2014.  In Appling v. 
Walker, decided in July, Wisconsin’s supreme court construed the state’s 
2006 DOMA as limited strictly to marriage and it refused to overturn a 
law extending marital benefits to registered domestic partners that the 
legislature had enacted during a brief period of Democratic control in 
2009.85  In Wolf v. Walker, decided in October, federal judge Barbara 
Crabb struck down Wisconsin’s DOMA in its entirety, concluding that 
it violated the federal equal-protection clause.86
In June 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court closed the legal debate over 
77. Id.
78. For a list of the court decisions in question, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2607–12 (2015). 
79. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Six in 10 Say Obama Same-Sex Marriage View Won’t Sway Vote,
GALLUP (May 11, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/154628/six-say-obama-sex-mar-
riage-view-won-sway-vote.aspx [https://perma.cc/T83Q-ZT54]. 
80. Illinois, Utah, and Ohio.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607–12. 
81. Oklahoma, Kentucky, Virginia, Texas, Tennessee, Michigan, Idaho, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Wisconsin, Indiana, Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, Alaska, Arizona, Wyoming, 
Kansas, Missouri, West Virginia, South Carolina, Montana, Arkansas, and Mississippi.  See
id.
82. South Dakota, Alabama, and Nebraska.  See id.
83. Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036 (N.J. 2013); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 
(N.M. 2013). 
84. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1994); Merritt v. Attorney Gen., 2013 WL 
6044329 (M.D. La. 2013); Ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Instit., 200 So. 3d 495 (Ala. 2015).  
Between 2000 and 2015 eleven states also legalized gay marriage through enactment of stat-
utes or constitutional amendments.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611. 
85. 2009 Wis. Act 28; Appling v. Walker, 2014 WI 96, ¶¶ 22–37, 358 Wis. 2d 132, 853 
N.W.2d 888. 
86. Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis.), aff’d, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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gay marriage when it held by a 5-4 vote that marriage was a fundamen-
tal liberty protected by the federal Constitution, one closely associated 
with constitutional rights of freedom of association and of privacy, and 
one that extended to all couples regardless of sexual orientation.87  Four 
dissenting justices sounded, with varying degrees of sharpness, the 
theme of deference to democratically-elected legislatures first sounded 
by the Goodridge dissenters.88  Within the space of seventeen years, gay 
Americans’ right of self-expression through marriage had gone from 
universal rejection to the law of the land.
III. MODERN BATTLEGROUNDS: STATE CONSTITUTIONS
The U.S. Constitution was designed to be an organic document, one 
confined to general governmental principles and not cluttered with pol-
icy details.  Despite occasional arguments that state constitutions should 
emulate that goal, they have been stuffed with social policy provisions 
and have regularly been amended as social and political tides have 
shifted in the states.89  During the late 20th century a wave of constitu-
tional populism led to passage of amendments designed to rein in gov-
ernments perceived as “overly expensive and powerful . . . insulated 
from popular concerns and popular control.”90  The populist impulse 
was closely connected to expressive individualism, a connection most 
directly expressed in amendments guaranteeing and expanding the 
right to bear arms, the right to hunt and fish, and gambling.91  Oppo-
nents of expressive individualism also made their voices heard through 
87. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2590. 
88. Id. at 2611–26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), 2626–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 2640–43 
(Alito, J., dissenting). 
89. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (referring to a “constitution 
intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises 
of human affairs”); CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY
CONTROVERSIES AND HISTORICAL PATTERNS xv, 24–30 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996). Cf. THOMAS
M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 34 (1868) (“How far the consti-
tution of a State shall descend into the particulars of government is a question of policy ad-
dressed to the convention which forms it.”). 
90. G. Alan Tarr, Models and Fashions in State Constitutionalism, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 729, 741. 
91. JOHN LYMAN MASON & MICHAEL NELSON, GOVERNING GAMBLING: A CENTURY
FOUNDATION REPORT 44–45 (2001); Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear 
Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191, 193–204 (2006) (state constitution amendments expanding 
the right to bear arms). 
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amendments, most notably DOMA amendments and amendments giv-
ing the English language official status.92
A. Expressive Constitutionalism: The Right to Bear Arms and to Hunt and 
Fish 
The view of personal weapons as an emblem of liberty has been 
deeply imbedded in American culture since colonial times.  Hunting 
and use of weapons for hunting were considered basic rights by all Eng-
lish classes.93  The Crown made no serious effort to restrict those rights 
until Charles II induced Parliament to pass the Game Act (1671) which 
drastically reduced the number of commoners permitted to hunt on 
Crown lands.94 The Act was deeply resented by the English populace 
and by American colonists who, as the Revolution approached, came to 
view arms restrictions as part of an effort to impose tyranny by elimi-
nating the means of self-protection.95  Hunting and fishing was less of a 
sore subject because the Crown and colonial proprietors had liberally 
extended such rights to colonists.96 Pennsylvania and Vermont inserted 
provisions in their Revolutionary-era constitutions providing that citi-
zens had a right to bear arms and to hunt and fish.97  Many states that 
came into the Union during the early 19th century included right-to-
bear-arms clauses in their constitutions, but few included hunting-and-
fishing clauses.98  Neither subject came up at Wisconsin’s constitutional 
conventions (1846, 1847–48).99  A few states worded their right-to-bear-
92. See generally John Dinan, State Constitutional Amendments and Individual Rights in the 
Twenty-First Century, 76 ALB. L. REV. 2105 (2013). 
93.  Robert Dowlut & Janet A. Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear 
Arms, 7 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 177, 180–83 (1982); Jeffrey Omar Usman, The Game is Afoot: 
Constitutionalizing the Right to Hunt and Fish in the Tennessee Constitution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 57, 
63–65 (2009). 
94. An Act for the Better Preservation of the Game, and for Secureing Warrens not 
Inclosed, and the Severall Fishings of this Realme (1671) 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM (Eng.) 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp745-746
[https://perma.cc/7CNF-8MS8] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017); Usman, supra note 93, at 60–66; 
Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 93, at 180–81. 
95. Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 93, at 181–82. 
96. Id. at 182; Usman, supra note 93, at 67–69. 
97. PA. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, clause XIII; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, § 15; see also 
Sayres v. Commonwealth, 88 Pa. 291 (Pa. 1879); State v. Rosenthal, 55 A. 610 (Vt. 1903); Vo-
lokh, supra note 91. 
98. See Volokh, supra note 91, at 206–17. 
99. See generally [27 COLLECTIONS, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL SERIES] THE STATE HIST. SOC. OF 
WIS., THE CONVENTION OF 1846 (Milo M. Quaife ed., 1918); [29 COLLECTIONS, 4
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arms provisions to make clear that the right was not limited to collective 
use of arms in defense of the state (for example, as part of militia service) 
but was individual and extended to self-defense; courts in states with 
ambiguous clauses almost uniformly took the same position.100
Following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963, 
gun-control advocates gained a prominent place on the American polit-
ical stage.  Concerns about increasing urban violence and crime 
prompted Congress to enact laws regulating purchase and use of fire-
arms; some cities went further and prohibited or drastically limited pos-
session of firearms within their limits.101  These developments elicited a 
strong backlash including a new wave of right-to-bear-arms amend-
ments: for example, after Maine’s supreme court suggested that the 
right to bear arms was collective only, Maine voters promptly enacted 
an amendment affirming an individual right to bear arms.102  Between 
1970 and 1998 thirteen other states did also,103 including Wisconsin 
(1998).104  Support for such amendments cut across traditional political 
lines: U.S. Senator Russell Feingold, a Wisconsin Democrat sympathetic 
CONSTITUTIONAL SERIES] THE STATE HIST. SOC. OF WIS., THE ATTAINMENT OF STATEHOOD
(Milo M. Quaife ed., 1928).
100. See Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 93, at 207 n.123; see generally Volokh, supra note 91. 
101. See Michael B. de Leeuw, The (New) New Judicial Federalism: State Constitutions and 
the Protection of the Individual Right to Bear Arms, 39 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1449, 1497–99 (2012); 
Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 93, at 184–91; see also, e.g., Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–
351, 82 Stat. 228; Act of Oct. 22, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–618, 82 Stat. 1234; Act of May 19, 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99–308, 100 Stat. 451; Act of Aug. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–408, 100 Stat. 920. 
102. ME. CONST., art. I, § 16 (amended 1987); State v. Friel, 508 A.2d 123 (Me. 1986); see
David B. Kopel, What State Constitutions Teach About the Second Amendment, 29 N. KY. L. REV.
827 (2002); David B. Kopel et al., A Tale of Three Cities: The Right to Bear Arms in State Supreme 
Courts, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1177 (1995); see also State v. Knight, 218 P.3d 1177 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2009); Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1976). 
103. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (1994); DEL. CONST. art. I § 20 (1987); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22 
(1970); LA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1974); ME. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1987); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1 
(1988); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 11(1) (1982); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art 2-a (1982); N.M. CONST. art. II, 
§ 6 (1971); N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1984); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6 (1984); VA. CONST. art. I, § 13 
(1971); W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 11 (1986); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 25 (1998). 
104. The states were: Illinois (1970), New Mexico and Virginia (1971), New Hampshire 
and Nevada (1982), Louisiana, North Dakota, and Utah (1984), West Virginia (1986), Maine 
and Delaware (1987), Nebraska (1988), Alabama (1994), and Wisconsin (1998).  Volokh, supra
note 91, 193–204. See WIS. CONST. art. I, § 25 (amended 1998) (providing that: “The people 
have the right to keep and bear arms for security, defense, hunting, recreation or any other 
lawful purpose”).  See also J. Res. 27, 92d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1996); J. Res. 21, 93d Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Wis. 1998). 
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to government regulation in many areas,105 supported his state’s amend-
ment as necessary to protect what he viewed as an essential civil right.106
A closely-divided U.S. Supreme Court held in 2008 and 2010 that the 
federal Second Amendment also created an individual right to bear 
arms.107 Gun-related violence continues to elicit calls for increased reg-
ulation and those who view guns as fundamental to liberty continue 
their vigil against such regulation.108
After 1970, efforts to eliminate certain types of hunting altogether 
appeared for the first time.  Many modern conservationists focused on 
animal protection and looked askance at hunting; between 1970 and 
2000 they secured laws banning all trapping in several western states 
and bans on hunting certain types of birds and animals in other states.109
Traditional conservationists, already concerned about the shrinking of 
hunting and fishing places due to urbanization, viewed such measures 
as a direct infringement of personal liberty and as a harbinger of addi-
tional bans in the future.110  As a result, between 1996 and 2015 eighteen 
states including Wisconsin (2003) added clauses to their constitutions 
establishing hunting and fishing as basic rights.111
B. Expressive Constitutionalism: Gambling 
American gambling law has had a long and shifting history.  Old-
stock pietistic Protestants viewed gambling as sinful and discouraged 
105. See John Nichols, Russ Feingold Wants to Lead a New Progressive Era in the Senate,
NATION, (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/russ-feingold-wants-to-lead-a-
new-progressive-era-in-the-senate/ [https://perma.cc/6KTK-KY65]. 
106. Joseph A. Scolaro, Feingold Backs Gun Amendment, RACINE (Wis.) J.-TIMES, Sept. 24, 
1998.
107. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
108. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Eric Lichtblau, Obama to Expand Gun Background Checks 
and Tighten Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/us/poli-
tics/obama-says-he-will-act-on-gun-control-in-coming-days.html?_v=0. 
109. Usman, supra note 93, at 77–80.  Trapping bans were enacted in California, Arizona, 
Colorado, Washington and Massachusetts (1994–2001); New Jersey prohibited bear hunting 
(2008) and Iowa prohibited dove hunting (2010). Id.
110. Id.
111. J. Res. 16, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2001); J. Res. 8, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2003).  
See WIS. CONST. art. I, § 26 (providing that: “The people have the right to fish, hunt, trap, and 
take game subject only to reasonable restrictions as prescribed by law.”).  See also State Con-
stitutional Right to Hunt and Fish, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, www.ncsl.org/re-
search/environment-and-natural-resources/state-constitutional-right-to-hunt-and-
fish.aspx#5 (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
39285-m
qt_100-3 Sheet No. 139 Side A      06/19/2017   09:53:44
39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 139 Side A      06/19/2017   09:53:44
C M
Y K
5 RANNEY-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/17 1:58 PM
2017] WISCONSIN LAW IN THE AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM 939 
it.112  Lotteries were tolerated if they used their proceeds for pious or 
socially worthy causes but in the 1830s, following a rash of corruption 
scandals, several states enacted constitutional amendments prohibiting 
lotteries.113  Many states that subsequently entered the union, including 
Wisconsin, followed suit.114  Gambling never disappeared: the urge to 
risk small amounts in the hope of great fortune remained strong, and 
most law enforcement officials looked the other way if gambling was 
done discreetly and on a small scale.115  The fortune-seeking urge sharp-
ened during the Depression, as did states’ searches for new sources of 
revenue, and during the 1930s many states legalized horse racing and 
pari-mutuel betting in the hope of meeting both needs.116  The pattern 
repeated itself in the late 20th century, this time with a distinct stamp of 
expressive individualism.  Starting in the late 1970s voters in many 
states complained of rising taxation and forced tax reductions, thus cre-
ating an acute need for new revenue sources.117  By then, traditional dis-
approval of gambling had largely been replaced by an individualist 
view of gambling as merely another lifestyle choice.118  As a result, many 
states replaced their 19th-century anti-lottery clauses with clauses ex-
plicitly authorizing lotteries and other forms of gambling.119  New 
Hampshire (1964) and New York (1967) were the first states to enact lot-
tery amendments; twelve states followed suit in the 1970s, seventeen in 
the 1980s, and six more in the 1990s120  The lottery amendments were 
accompanied by a steady stream of amendments authorizing other 
forms of gambling.121
Wisconsin’s experience was typical.  Starting in the early 1970s vot-
ers repeatedly amended the state’s constitution, first to allow bingo for 
112. MASON & NELSON, supra note 91, at 7–8. 
113. Id. at 8. 
114. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 24; MASON & NELSON, supra note 91, at 8–10; DOUGLASS
CHARLES ELLERBE FARNSLEY, GAMBLING AND THE LAW: THE WISCONSIN EXPERIENCE, 1848–
1980, at 58–59 (1980) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Wisconsin). 
115. FARNSLEY, supra note 114, at 61–72; MASON & NELSON, supra note 91, at 8–9; see
Douglass Charles Ellerbe Farnsley, Gambling and the Law: The Wisconsin Experience, 1848–1980,
1980 WIS. L. REV. 811, 856–59. 
116. MASON & NELSON, supra note 91, at 8–9. 
117. PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 67–69. 
118. MASON & NELSON, supra note 91, at 9–16. 
119. Id. at 9–12. 
120. Id. at 9–10. 
121. Id. at 8–13, 15–18; FARNSLEY, supra note 114, at 61–68. 
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charitable fundraising purposes (1973)122 and then to allow charitable 
raffles (1977).123  Initial efforts to repeal the constitutional ban on lotter-
ies failed but lottery supporters finally prevailed in 1987.124  Voters then 
authorized a state lottery and pari-mutuel betting.125  During the course 
of three decades, gambling went from a morally suspect and legally pro-
hibited form of individual expression to near-universal social and legal 
acceptance. 
C. Conservative Constitutionalism: DOMAs and English-Language 
Amendments 
Constitutional amendments have been used to check expressive in-
dividualism as well as to serve it.  The wave of DOMAs enacted between 
1998 and 2006 as a firewall against gay marriage, discussed above, is the 
most prominent example.126  Some DOMAs were worded to bar only 
marriage, some barred marriage and civil unions, and others explicitly 
prohibited legislatures from conferring any rights associated with mar-
riage on gay couples.127  Prior to the Supreme Court’s 2015 Obergefell128
decision, disputes arose in several states with limited DOMAs whether 
such DOMAs should be interpreted expansively to deny gay citizens all 
marriage-related rights.129 State courts, including Wisconsin’s supreme 
court in the 2014 Appling case, generally refused expansive interpreta-
tion.130  Traditional principles of statutory construction, together with 
the fact that during some ratification campaigns, including Wisconsin’s, 
DOMA advocates had told voters that their DOMAs would apply to 
marriage only, made the decisions relatively easy.131
122. J. Res. 31, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1971); J. Res. 6, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1973); 
WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (amended 1973). 
123. J. Res. 19, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1976); J. Res. 6, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1977); 
WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (amended 1977). 
124. DAN RITSCHE, STATE OF WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, LRB-00-RB-1, THE
EVOLUTION OF LEGALIZED GAMBLING IN WISCONSIN (2000).
125. J. Res. 35-36, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1986); J. Res. 3-4, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 
1987); WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (amended 1987). 
126. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
127. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
128. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
129. Infra note 131. 
130. Appling v. Walker, 2014 WI 96, ¶¶ 22–37, 358 Wis. 2d 132, 853 N.W.2d 888. 
131. Appling, ¶¶ 22–37 (interpreting Wisconsin’s DOMA, WIS. CONST. art. XII, § 1 
(amended 2006), which provided that “a legal status identical or substantially similar to that 
of marriage” would not be recognized for gay and unmarried couples). Compare Knight v. 
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During the late 19th and early 20th centuries courts in several states, 
including Wisconsin, attempted to force cultural assimilation by prohib-
iting the use of all languages except English for classroom instruction in 
schools.132  After the U.S. Supreme Court struck down several English-
only laws in Meyer v. Nebraska133 such laws were thought to be dead, but 
in the late 1960s they began to surface once again in response to a new 
wave of immigration that began after Congress relaxed immigration 
constraints and a changing world economic picture increased incentives 
for Hispanic migrants to enter the United States both legally and ille-
gally.134  America’s Hispanic population grew dramatically, increasing 
from 3.2% of the total population (1960) to 6.4% (1980) and to 16.3% in 
2010.  The number of American residents with a primary language other 
than English or Spanish also rose: in 2010, about 21% of all American 
residents spoke a language other than English in their homes.135  As in 
earlier eras of heavy immigration,136 many Americans viewed the new 
immigrants’ expressions of cultural diversity, particularly use of their 
native languages rather than English in everyday life, as a threat to the 
nation’s well-being.137
Illinois enacted the first modern English-only statute in 1969.138 The 
Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (including a discussion similar to the 
Appling case), with Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor, 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008) (hold-
ing that Michigan’s DOMA, Mich. Const. art. I, § 25 (amended 2004), which provided that 
heterosexual marriages “shall be the only agreement[s] recognized as a marriage or similar 
union for any purpose,” precluded domestic partnership benefits for members of gay cou-
ples).
132. See RICHARD N. CURRENT, THE HISTORY OF WISCONSIN VOL. II: THE CIVIL WAR
YEARS, 1848–1873, at 548–49 (1976); Louise P. Kellogg, The Bennett Law in Wisconsin, 2 WIS.
MAG. OF HIST. 3, Sept. 1918; AHLSTROM, supra note 2, at 828–33. 
133. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
134. See PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 26–28, 292–303. 
135. CAMILLE RYAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LANGUAGE USE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011,
AM. CMTY. SURV. REP. (2013), www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acs-22.pdg (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2017). See Josh Hill et al., Watch Your Language! The Kansas Law Review Survey of 
Official-English and English-Only Laws and Politics, 57 KAN. L. REV. 669, 671–72 (2008). 
136. See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM
1860–1925 (1963); LA VERN J. RIPPLEY, THE GERMAN-AMERICANS 99–128 (1976); KYLE G. VOLK,
MORAL MINORITIES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 30–95 (2014).
137. See K.C. McAlpin, Why English Should Be the Official Language of the United States?,
PROENGLISH.ORG, www.proenglish.org/official-english/why-official-english.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 24, 2017) (characterizing increase in non-English-speaking population as “ominous[ 
] for the nation’s linguistic unity” and criticizing the late-20th-century shift away from the 
melting-pot ideal toward multiculturalism).
138. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 460/20 (1969). 
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statute was little more than a symbolic endorsement of assimilation: it 
designated English as the state’s official language without more.  But in 
1978 Hawaii enacted the first English-only laws with specific limits: it 
required that government business be conducted in English and speci-
fied that government officials were under no obligation to provide 
Spanish or other foreign-language translations.139  A steady stream of 
English-only laws followed: thirteen states enacted such measures in the 
1980s,140 six in the 1990s,141 and eight in the 2000s.142  A handful of states 
including Wisconsin have resisted the tide.  Most early measures fol-
lowed Illinois’ symbolic model; a few contained vaguely-worded 
clauses authorizing state legislatures to enact “appropriate” implement-
ing legislation.143  Since 1995, however, nearly all legislatures enacting 
English-only laws have inserted specific limits in those laws, usually 
limited to the conduct of government business but in some cases requir-
ing that school instruction be in English notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Meyer.144
Opponents have not challenged the laws’ central premise that as-
similation has value; instead, they have argued that the laws discrimi-
nate against non-English speakers and hamper rather than promote as-
similation.145  The two sides joined battle in Alaska and Arizona, whose 
laws were among the most draconian English-only laws.146  Both states’ 
139. HAW. CONST. art. XV, § 4 (amended 1978); Act effective May 22, 1979, S.B. No. 45, 
1979 Haw. Sess. Laws 189. 
140. Virginia (1981, statute with specific limits); Indiana and Kentucky (1984, symbolic 
statutes); Tennessee (1984, specific limits); California (1986, constitutional amendment au-
thorizing appropriate legislation); Georgia (1986, specific limits); Arkansas, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, and South Carolina (1987, symbolic); Colorado and Florida 
(1988, authorizing appropriate legislation). See Language Legislation in the U.S.A., LANGUAGE
POL’Y, http://www.languagepolicy.net/archives/langleg.htm [https://perma.cc/GJY5-
43JM] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017), and statutes linked thereto. 
141. Alabama (1990, authorizing appropriate legislation); Montana, New Hampshire 
and South Dakota (1995, specific limits); Wyoming (1996, same); Alaska (1998, same). See id.
142. Utah (2000, specific limits); Iowa (2002, same); Arizona (2006, symbolic); Idaho and 
Kansas (2007, specific limits); Missouri (2008, same); Oklahoma (2010, same).  See id.
143. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 135, at 681–83. 
144. See supra notes 133–34, 138–42; Hill, supra note 135, at 673–74. 
145. See, e.g., Jennifer Bonilla Moreno, ¿Only English?  How Bilingual Education Can Miti-
gate the Damage of English-Only, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 197, 197–99 (2012) (arguing 
against the English-only laws that apply to school instruction); McAlpin, supra note 137 (ar-
guing that adoption of a universal language is necessary to national greatness and that Eng-
lish-only laws, particularly those that prohibit bilingual instruction in schools, have helped 
recent immigrants by forcing them to assimilate more quickly). 
146. Arizona law required that government employees “act” only in English.  ARIZ.
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supreme courts gave cautious deference to the laws, emphasizing that 
promotion of a common English language is a legitimate governmental 
goal; both courts held that government has no obligation to communi-
cate with non-English speakers in their native language but that gov-
ernment employees who speak languages other than English may not 
be barred from using them.147  To do so, said Arizona justice James 
Moeller, would “effectively cut[] off governmental communication” 
with residents who have no English or limited English and would vio-
late their rights of free speech and equal protection of the laws.148
Alaska’s supreme court also held that such restrictions would violate 
non-English speakers’ constitutional right to petition government.149
IV. MODERN BATTLEGROUNDS: THE DECLINE OF EDUCATIONAL 
ASSIMILATIONISM
During the years following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954)150 that school segregation was uncon-
stitutional, the assimilationist vision of public schools appeared to have 
reached its zenith: black Americans, it was thought, would now be able 
to partake fully of the educational melting pot and the opportunities it 
held.  But implementation of that vision remained stubbornly elusive.151
During the ensuing decades, the rise of expressive individualism and 
the decline of assimilationism in education manifested themselves in 
CONST. art. XXVIII.  Alaska law required that English be used in all government transactions 
and that government records be maintained in English.  ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.12.300–.398 
(2016).
147. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII; ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.12.300–.398 (2016). 
148. Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 987 (Ariz. 1998). 
149. Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 187 (Alaska 2007).  In 
2002, Oklahoma’s supreme court gave an advisory opinion that a similar prohibition in that 
state’s proposed English-only amendment was unconstitutional.  The proposed amendment 
was withdrawn but was eventually adopted in a revised form that did not prohibit govern-
ment officials from communicating in languages other than English. In re Initiative Petition 
No. 366, 46 P.3d 123 (Okla. 2002); OKLA. CONST. art. XXX, §1 (2010); see Hill, supra note 135, 
at 684–87. 
150. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
151. See, e.g., TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS,
1954–1963, at 222–24, 633–72, 821–23 (1988); KEVIN MICHAEL KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN CONSERVATISM (2005); J. ANTHONY LUKAS, COMMON GROUND:
A TURBULENT DECADE IN THE LIVES OF THREE AMERICAN FAMILIES (1985); MARK T. MULDER,
SHADES OF WHITE FLIGHT: EVANGELICAL CONGREGATIONS AND URBAN DEPARTURE (2015);
WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: IMPLEMENTING BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1–18, 27–28,
44–58 (Brian J. Daugherity & Charles C. Bolton eds., 2008); PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 388–
95, 477–81. 
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several ways.  First, an increasing number of Americans came to view 
education as a matter of customization and personal choice, and the 
courts supported that trend.152  Wisconsin provided one of the leading 
examples: in State v. Yoder (1971) Amish parents, whose religious beliefs 
called for termination of schooling after eighth grade (by which time, 
they believed, their children would have the skills necessary to lead the 
simple life that their faith called for), challenged attempts to enforce 
against them a Wisconsin law requiring attendance to age sixteen.153
The state’s supreme court held that compulsory education did not con-
stitute a compelling state interest and that the parental right of control, 
at least in matters implicating religion, was paramount; the U.S. Su-
preme Court agreed.154
The school voucher movement has been the most important and 
most controversial manifestation of expressive individualism in Amer-
ican education law.  Voucher systems directly promote educational in-
dividualism and represent an implicit (or in the case of supporters such 
as Justice Ceci, an explicit) rejection of educational assimilationism.155
Libertarian economist Milton Friedman first proposed vouchers in the 
1950s as a way of extending the free market to education but it took sev-
eral decades of rising individualism and frustration with the difficulties 
of school integration to create the critical mass necessary for vouchers’ 
political success.156
Critical mass was first reached in Wisconsin.  In the early 1960s, res-
idential segregation was firmly entrenched in Milwaukee and as a re-
sult, MPS’s long-standing policy of sending pupils to neighborhood 
schools created severe school segregation.157  After more than a decade 
of political and legal efforts by the Milwaukee branch of the NAACP to 
152. See BENJAMIN MICHAEL SUPERFINE, EQUALITY IN EDUCATION LAW AND POLICY,
1954–2010, at 199–200 (2013). 
153. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 434, 182 N.W.2d 539, 540 (1971), aff’d, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972).
154. Id.
155. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
156. JOHN F. WITTE, THE MARKET APPROACH TO EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS OF 
AMERICA’S FIRST VOUCHER PROGRAM 34–35 (2000); see James B. Egle, Comment, The Consti-
tutional Implications of School Choice, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 459, 459–61. 
157. See 6 WILLIAM F. THOMPSON, HISTORY OF WISCONSIN: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE,
1940–1965, at 323–26 (1988); JOE WILLIAM TROTTER JR., BLACK MILWAUKEE: THE MAKING OF 
AN INDUSTRIAL PROLETARIAT, 1915–1945, at 30–32, 186–97, 215–20 (1985); WITH ALL
DELIBERATE SPEED: IMPLEMENTING BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, supra note 151, at 221–
22.
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end segregation, federal judge John Reynolds held in Amos v. Board of 
School Directors of City of Milwaukee (1976)158 that MPS’s policies violated 
black pupils’ equal-protection rights, and he ordered the plaintiffs and 
MPS to develop a remedial plan.  Reynolds took a firmly assimilationist 
view, rejecting protests that breaking up the neighborhood school sys-
tem would only lead to white flight and more segregation.159  “The Con-
stitution does not guarantee one a quality education,” he reasoned; “it 
guarantees one an equal education, and the law in this country is that a 
segregated education system that is mandated by school authorities is 
inherently unequal.”160  As opponents had predicted, white flight from 
Milwaukee to its suburbs frustrated all efforts to integrate MPS: by the 
late 1980s, those efforts were widely judged a failure.  Black MPS stu-
dents’ achievement levels continued to lag badly behind those of white 
students, racial conflicts in MPS schools were increasing, and anti-as-
similation voices arose within Milwaukee’s black community for the 
first time. 161
When a proposal by black leaders, including educator Howard 
Fuller and state representative Polly Williams, to create a separate mi-
nority-oriented school district failed they made common cause with 
Governor Tommy Thompson and Catholic leaders who saw in MPS’s 
troubles a new opening for public support of private schools, and in 
1990, Wisconsin’s legislature narrowly approved the nation’s first 
voucher program.162  Many wavering lawmakers supported the pro-
gram only after Thompson and Williams assured them that it was a tem-
porary experiment intended to help close the racial achievement gap,163
and they made the 1990 program a modest one: it was limited to 1% of 
MPS’s student population, limited eligibility to families earning up to 
175% of federal poverty-level income, and made parochial schools inel-
igible.164  Even in its modest form the law represented a breakthrough; 
158. 408 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Wis. 1976), aff’d sub nom. Armstrong v. Brennan, 539 F.2d 625 
(7th Cir. 1976), remanded, 433 U.S. 672 (1977). 
159. Id. at 821. 
160. Id.
161. WIS. ADVISORY COMM., REPORT TO U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, IMPACT OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION IN MILWAUKEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS ON QUALITY EDUCATION FOR 
MINORITIES . . . 15 YEARS LATER 2–5, 22–25 (1992); Lawrence Sussman, Judges Say Racial Ten-
sion May Be Rising—They Ask Schools to Help Foster Understanding, MILWAUKEE J., May 22, 
1990, at B1; WITTE, supra note 156, at 43–44. 
162. 1989 Wis. Act 366 § 228. 
163. WITTE, supra note 156, at 43–44. 
164.   1989 Wis. Act 366 § 228. 
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it survived constitutional challenge by the narrowest of margins but the 
supreme court’s Davis decision, although close, made clear that the era 
of judicial support for assimilationism was over.165
After Davis was decided Milwaukee business leaders and Catholic 
leaders persuaded the 1995 legislature to expand the number of eligible 
students (to 15% of MPS’s student population) and to include parochial 
schools in the program.166  Williams objected to the shift of emphasis 
toward educational privatization and away from aiding black students 
and she withdrew her support,167 but Fuller continued to believe that 
vouchers were the best option for Milwaukee’s black community.  
“Choice,” he said, “is like a bomb that needs to the thrown into a system 
that is so bad, so rotten, that nothing else will work.”168 In the same year, 
Ohio enacted the nation’s second voucher program, targeting another 
ailing big-city school system (Cleveland’s).169  Both states’ supreme 
courts rejected challenges to the inclusion of parochial schools in 
voucher programs based on federal and state constitutional clauses 
against state support of religion.170  In Jackson v. Benson (1998) Wisconsin 
justice Donald Steinmetz, speaking for the majority, held that the fact 
that the law did not prohibit use of funds for sectarian purposes was not 
constitutionally fatal: The voucher law provided that state funds would 
go to parents, not directly to sectarian schools, and that satisfied recent 
U.S. Supreme Court holdings that all relationships that avoided “exces-
sive entanglement” between church and state were permitted under the 
federal First Amendment.171  The law was also consistent with Yoder: It 
comported with “Wisconsin tradition and past precedent . . . according 
parents the primary role in decisions regarding the education and up-
bringing of their children.”172  Ohio’s court was somewhat more cau-
tious, warning that private schools’ “success . . . should not come at the 
expense of our public education system” and hinting that a voucher pro-
gram that deprived public schools of funds to a harmful extent might 
165. Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992). 
166. 1995 Wis. Act 27 §§ 4002–4009. 
167. WITTE, supra note 156, at 43–44. 
168. Id. at 198. 
169. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974–3313.979 (1995). 
170. Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 879, 578 N.W.2d 602, 621 (1998); Simmons-Har-
ris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999), aff’d, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
171. Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 853–76. 
172. Id. at 879. 
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violate state constitutional provisions mandating a public school sys-
tem.173
Some voucher supporters hailed the Wisconsin and Ohio decisions 
as the dawn of an era in which vouchers and privatization would eclipse 
public education, and voucher programs began to proliferate; but the 
dream of broad educational privatization proved as elusive as the post-
Brown dream of full racial assimilation.174  Ten additional states enacted 
voucher or tax-credit programs for private-school tuition payments be-
tween 1997 and 2010,175 and another wave of thirteen states enacted such 
programs between 2011 and 2015.176  Most programs were limited to 
children living below a fixed income level, to children in special-educa-
tion programs, to children in schools designated “failing” by state or 
federal authorities, or some combination of the three.177  Voucher oppo-
nents continued to challenge the new laws on a regular basis, now rely-
ing heavily on their state constitutions’ educational provisions rather 
than federal and state religious-establishment clauses.178
Opponents won some victories: the Florida, Arizona, and Colorado 
supreme courts struck down their states’ voucher laws in 2006, 2009, 
and 2015 respectively.179  The three decisions made clear that ultimately, 
173. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 212. 
174. See Julie F. Mead, The Right to an Education or the Right to Shop for Schooling: Examin-
ing Voucher Programs in Relation to State Constitutional Guarantees, 42 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 703, 
714–27 (2015). 
175. Vouchers: Arizona (1997), Florida (1999), Utah (2005), Georgia (2007), Louisiana 
(2008), Oklahoma (2010). Tax credits: Pennsylvania and Florida (2001), Iowa, Rhode Island, 
Arizona and Georgia (2006), Indiana (2009). See Mead, supra note 174, at 707–13; School
Voucher Laws: State-by-State Comparison, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
www.ncsl.org/research/education/voucher-law-comparison.aspx (last visited Apr. 24, 
2017).
176. Vouchers: Arizona, Colorado, Indiana (2011); Mississippi (2012), North Carolina 
(2013), Arkansas (2015). Tax credits: Oklahoma (2011), New Hampshire, Virginia and Louisi-
ana (2012); South Carolina and Alabama (2013), Kansas (2014), Montana, Nevada, Tennessee, 
and Mississippi (2015).  See also Mead, supra note 174, at 707–13; School Voucher Laws: State-
by-State Comparison, supra note 175.  In 2011, the income eligibility ceiling for Wisconsin’s 
program was raised and the cap on the number of eligible students was eliminated and the 
program was extended to certain other Wisconsin school districts with low property values 
or other indicia of poverty.  2011 Wis. Acts 32, 47. 
177. Mead, supra note 174, at 715–27; School Voucher Laws: State-by-State Comparison, su-
pra note 175. 
178. Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178 (Ariz. 2009); Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cty. 
Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 461 (Colo. 2015); Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006); Meredith v. 
Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213 (Ind. 2013); Hart v. State, 774 S.E.2d 281 (N.C. 2015). 
179. Cain, 202 P.3d 1178; Taxpayers for Pub. Educ., 351 P.3d 461; Bush, 919 So. 2d 392. 
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the fate of voucher programs in all states will depend on the wording of 
their state constitutions’ education provisions, which vary widely.180
The Arizona and Colorado courts relied heavily on “Blaine clauses” in 
their states’ constitutions, enacted in the late 19th century in response to 
a nativist-fueled revolt against immigrants’ efforts to secure public 
funding for parochial schools.181  Arizona’s Blaine clause provided that 
“no . . . appropriation of public money [shall be] made in aid of any 
church, or private or sectarian school”;182 Colorado’s clause provided 
that state and local governments may not do “anything in aid of any 
church or sectarian society, or for any sectarian purpose, or to help sup-
port or sustain any school . . . controlled by any church or sectarian de-
nomination.”183
Florida’s court went the farthest, relying not on a Blaine clause but 
on a constitutional provision requiring the state to provide a “uniform, 
efficient . . . and . . . high quality system of free public schools.”184  The 
court reasoned that the clause implicitly barred any public support of 
private schools because in an era of severe state budgetary constraints, 
financial support of private schools would necessarily deprive public 
schools of funds.185  The Florida court’s decision put it at odds with the 
Indiana and North Carolina supreme courts, which in 2013 and 2015 
respectively held that similar clauses in their states’ constitutions did 
not foreclose public funding of voucher systems.186  One Wisconsin 
voucher critic has suggested, consistent with the Florida court’s reason-
ing and with the Ohio supreme court’s warning in Simmons-Harris about
private-school competition for scarce public funds, that if Wisconsin’s 
legislature continues to expand voucher funding and cut state public-
180. Cain, 202 P.3d at 1185; Taxpayers for Pub. Educ., 351 P.3d at 469–75; Bush, 919 So. 2d 
at 402–05. 
181. See Corinna Barrett Lain, God, Civic Virtue, and the American Way: Reconstructing En-
gel, 67 STANFORD L. REV. 479, 488–90 (2015); DONALD E. BOLES, THE BIBLE, RELIGION AND THE 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 30–37 (1965).
182. ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10. 
183. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7; see generally SUPERFINE, supra note 152, at 147–50; Mead, 
supra note 174. 
184. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); Bush, 919 So. 2d at 415. 
185. Bush, 919 So. 2d at 408–09 (interpreting FLA. CONST. Art. IX, § 1). 
186. Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213 (Ind. 2013) (interpreting Hart v. State, 774 S.E.2d 
281 (N.C. 2015) (interpreting N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“[t]he people have a right to the privi-
lege of education”), art. V, § 2 (no law except for public purpose) and art. IX, § 6 (certain state 
funds “shall be . . . used exclusively for establishing and maintaining a uniform system of 
free public schools”)). 
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school funding it may eventually run afoul of the state constitution.187
Ironically, throughout the voucher controversy the public schools’ share 
of total student population has remained steady, and vouchers have re-
ceived a cool reception from many wealthier, predominantly white dis-
tricts whose parents worry that vouchers might result in increased inter-
district student transfers and dilution of their districts’ levels of achieve-
ment.188
Another area of education in which individualism and assimilation-
ism have clashed is public-school financing.  The fact that states finance 
schools primarily through local property taxes has given wealthy dis-
tricts a substantial advantage over poorer districts in providing high-
quality education, and in the late 1960s assimilationists began challeng-
ing property-tax-based school finance systems as violative of the federal 
equal-protection clause.189  They gained an important early victory 
when California’s supreme court struck down its state’s school-finance 
system (1971)190 but two years later, in San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez (1973) the U.S. Supreme Court held that funding 
discrepancies based on local wealth do not violate the federal equal pro-
tection clause.191  The California court responded by striking down Cal-
ifornia’s school-finance system again, this time based on the state con-
stitution’s equal-protection clause.192 Assimilationists then turned 
(1973–84) to state constitutional equal-protection and education clauses, 
particularly those that required states to provide a “thorough” or “effi-
cient” school system or the like.193  They had some success but even 
when courts took a communitarian view of school financing, crafting 
and implementing solutions proved to be as difficult as it had for segre-
gation.194  Courts preferred to leave that task to legislatures and many 
187. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 212 (Ohio 1999); Mead, supra note 174, at 
736–37.
188. SUPERFINE, supra note 152, at 147–48.  From 1995 to 2007, approximately 93% of all 
schoolchildren attended public schools, 6% attended private schools, and 1% were home 
schooled; the figures changed little during that period.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CENTER
FOR EDUC. STATS., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2009, at 126, 130, 134 (2009),
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009081.pdf [https://perma.cc/RB5P-BBW5]. 
189. SUPERFINE, supra note 152, at 12–15, 75–77; James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money,
109 YALE L.J. 249, 267–68 (1999). 
190. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
191. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
192. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 919 (Cal. 1976). 
193. SUPERFINE, supra note 152, at 75, 100–06, 120–24; Ryan, supra note 189, at 268–72. 
194. Ryan, supra note 189, at 271–72. 
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legislatures resisted or were simply unable to find good solutions. 
Wealthy districts often responded to equalization efforts by levying 
supplemental taxes in order to maintain their children’s competitive ad-
vantage.195  In the late 1980s, assimilationists began to shift away from 
equality as a goal and to argue that state education clauses required 
states to provide sufficient funds for an “adequate” education in all dis-
tricts.196  The shift represented a triumph of sorts for individualism: in 
the words of one commentator, “that poor and minority schools will re-
main separate from white and wealthier schools [now] appears to be 
taken as a given.”197
The course of the school-finance controversy in Wisconsin was typ-
ically bumpy.  In Buse v. Smith (1976), a divided supreme court struck 
down a law that used some property taxes collected from wealthy dis-
tricts to subsidize education in poorer districts; the court relied heavily 
on an unusual Wisconsin constitutional provision that required local 
districts to provide a portion of all school funding.198  In Kukor v. Grover 
(1989), reformers mounted a new challenge based on the state’s uni-
formity clause as well as its equal-protection clause.199  The Kukor court’s 
decision foreshadowed Davis in some respects: the majority held that 
the state constitution required only equality of basic educational oppor-
tunity and rejected the new “adequacy” theory, again based heavily on 
the state constitution’s local-finance provision.200  Local responsibility, 
the majority reasoned, carried with it a measure of local discretion and 
195. SUPERFINE, supra note 152, at 147–49. See generally Michael Heise, Litigated Learning 
and the Limits of Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2417, 2437–45 (2004); Ryan, supra note 189, at 266–69. 
196. Court decisions in Kentucky and Montana accepting this argument inaugurated 
the new phase and were influential in persuading other state courts to do likewise.  Rose v. 
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v.
State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).  For the period 1989–2000, Ryan has identified eleven court 
decisions adopting this argument and eleven decisions rejecting it.  Ryan, supra note 189, at 
268–69, nn.84–85; see also SUPERFINE, supra note 152, at 120–24. 
197. Ryan, supra note 189, at 271–72. 
198. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 4 (providing that “Each town and city shall be required to raise 
by tax, annually, for the support of common schools therein, a sum not less than one-half the 
amount received by such town or city respectively for school purposes from the income of 
the school fund.”); Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976). 
199. 148 Wis. 2d 469, 484–94, 436 N.W.2d 568, 575–78 (1989); WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3 
(providing in part that “the legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district 
schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall be free and 
without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years”). 
200. Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d 469; Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992). 
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control.201  The same justices who would defend assimilationism in Da-
vis dissented in Kukor, arguing that the existing aid formula was a “dis-
grace” to the ideal of “free public education for rich and poor alike.”202
In Vincent v. Voight (2000) the court joined the shift from equality to ad-
equacy by holding that the state’s equal-protection clause encompassed 
the right to an adequate education, although the justices differed on 
whether the aid formula then in effect met the new standard.203  One 
dissenter, Justice Diane Sykes, argued that past difficulties in imple-
menting equality of opportunity through equalized funding showed 
that school funding was primarily a policy matter for individual school 
districts in which courts had no business intervening.204
V. MODERN BATTLEGROUNDS: ABORTION AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE
Abortion has been a central battleground in the struggle over expres-
sive individualism.  Abortion elicits passionate opposition because it, 
like expressive individualism generally, clashes with many Americans’ 
core desire for “clear, unbending moral and behavioral codes” enforced 
through group unity and strong social leadership.205  In addition, many 
opponents view abortion as murder, an issue as to which any compro-
mise or slackening of effort would be profoundly immoral.206  By con-
trast, many abortion-rights supporters give first priority to access to 
contraception: they view abortion not as a positive good but as a “re-
grettable but necessary fallback” to be used when contraception fails.207
The greater passion that abortion opponents have brought to the battle 
has given them success out of proportion to their numbers. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) was a transitional moment for both sides.208
In Casey the high Court disappointed abortion opponents by making 
201. Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 490–95. 
202. Id. at 525 (Bablitch, J., dissenting). See Suzanne M. Steinke, Comment, The Exception 
to the Rule: Wisconsin’s Fundamental Right to Education and Public School Financing, 1995 WIS. L.
REV. 1387. 
203. Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 93, ¶¶ 48–78, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 388. 
204. Id. ¶¶ 190–92, 197–98, 202 (Sykes, J., concurring and dissenting). 
205. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 24, at 62. 
206. Id. at 91–95; Kelefa Sanneh, The Intensity Gap: Can A Pro-Life Platform Win Elections?,
NEW YORKER, Oct. 27, 2014; Jon Perr, How Anti-Abortion Intensity Wins in Pro-Choice America,
DAILY KOS, www.dailykos.com/story/2015/04/26/1379912 (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
207. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 24, at 92–93. 
208. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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clear that it would not overturn the zone of abortion rights it had created 
in Roe v. Wade (1973),209 but it also replaced Roe’s simple three-part test 
of legality with a more generalized standard that states could not place 
an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to abort a non-quickened fe-
tus.210  The Casey Court also held that making it more difficult for eligible 
women to obtain abortions was not necessarily an undue burden.211
This encouraged opponents in their efforts to restrict abortion through 
extensive regulation of abortion procedures, an effort that has continued 
without letup since Casey and has accelerated dramatically since 2010.212
Abortion opponents have procured passage of a wide variety of anti-
abortion measures since Casey including, most commonly, (i) informed-
consent laws requiring abortion providers to provide information to pa-
tients emphasizing the physical and psychological risks of abortion and 
promoting alternatives,213 together with laws requiring parental consent 
for minors to have an abortion;214 (ii) waiting-period laws requiring that 
patients wait a certain period, usually twenty-four or forty-eight hours, 
after counseling before an abortion is performed;215 (iii) targeted-regu-
lation-of-abortion-provider (TRAP) laws that, for example, require doc-
tors performing abortions to have admitting privileges at a local hospi-
tal or require abortion clinics to have facilities and staff equivalent to a 
full-service ambulatory surgical center;216 (iv) laws prohibiting public 
209. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
210. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876–79. Roe held that: (i) during the first trimester of pregnancy, 
states could not interfere with a woman’s choice to have an abortion; (ii) from the end of the 
first trimester until quickening, states could regulate abortion but only in order to protect 
maternal health; and (iii) from that point until birth, the state could regulate abortion in order 
to protect “potential[]. . . life.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–65. 
211. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877–78, 880–84. Three members of the majority retreated from 
post-Roe, pre-Casey decisions that had suggested the Court would look at such regulations 
with a skeptical eye. Id.
212. See David Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical Perspective,
62 ALB. L. REV. 833, 846–48 (1999); Maya Manian, Lessons from Personhood’s Defeat: Abortion 
Restrictions and Side Effects on Women’s Health, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 75, 83–84 (2013). 
213. In 2015 nearly all states had informed-consent law, although the details of the laws 
varied extensively. An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws 
[https://perma.cc/H4FC-XEQS] (last visited on Apr. 24, 2017). 
214. As of 2015, twenty-five states required parental consent for an abortion; thirteen 
states required only that parents be given notice before the abortion.  Id.
215. As of 2015, four states required a seventy-two-hour waiting period, three states a 
forty-eight-hour period, twenty states a twenty-four-hour period, and one state an eighteen-
hour period. Id.
216. See infra notes 230–31 and accompanying test. 
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funding of abortions through Medicaid and other medical insurance 
programs;217 and (v) deadline laws that test the limits of Roe by prohib-
iting all abortions after a period of time close to (and sometimes before) 
the end of the first trimester, the period during which, under Roe, a 
woman’s right to choose abortion is absolute.218  As the graph below 
illustrates, the number of restrictive laws has grown steadily since Ca-
sey:219 
 
Abortion-rights advocates have mounted constitutional challenges 
to many of the post-Casey laws.220  Results have been mixed.  Courts 
 
217. As of 2015, thirty-three states prohibited use of public funds to perform abortions 
except (in some states) in cases of danger to the mother’s life or pregnancies resulting from 
rape or incest.  An Overview of Abortion Laws, supra note 213. 
218. As of 2015, twelve states prohibited abortions after twenty weeks of pregnancy 
(with exceptions where an abortion is necessary to save the mother’s life or preserve her 
health); eight states prohibited abortions after twenty-four weeks; twenty states prohibited 
abortions after fetal viability, the earliest point at which Roe allowed state restriction of abor-
tion; and three states prohibited abortions from the beginning of the third trimester.  Id. 
219. Heather D. Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, A Surge of State Abortion Restrictions Puts 
Providers—and the Women They Serve—in the Crosshairs, 17 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 9 (2014) 
(giving the 2013 statistics); Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, Troubling Trend: More States 
Hostile to Abortion Rights as Middle Ground Shrinks, 15 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 14 (2012) (giv-
ing the 2000, 2005, and 2011 statistics). 
220. See infra notes 221, 223–27. 
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faced with challenges to laws prohibiting abortion at twenty weeks or 
at any time prior to fetal viability have universally adhered to the Roe
framework and have struck down the laws.221  The Casey Court indi-
cated that informed-consent and waiting-period requirements did not 
automatically create an undue burden on abortion rights222 and accord-
ingly, both federal and state courts have struck down such laws spar-
ingly and have trimmed them only at the edges.223  The fate of informed-
consent laws often has depended on how openly they were promoted 
as anti-abortion measures at the time of enactment.224  Federal and state 
courts have almost universally upheld waiting-period laws, although 
many have indicated that in order to pass constitutional muster such 
laws must contain exceptions where a woman’s life or health is in im-
mediate peril.225
Public-funding restrictions and TRAP laws have generated the most 
legal controversy.  In Harris v. McRae (1980) the Supreme Court held that 
the Hyde Amendment, prohibiting federal funding of abortions except 
where necessary to preserve the mother’s health or life, was constitu-
tional; it rejected arguments that singling out abortion services for de-
funding violated the federal equal-protection clause.226  Abortion-rights 
supporters attempted with some success to combat similar funding re-
strictions at the state level by turning to a variety of state constitutional 
provisions.  At least seven supreme courts have interpreted their states’ 
221. See, e.g., MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2015); Edwards v. 
Beck, 786 F.3d 1113 (8th Cir. 2015); Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013); Dawn E. 
Johnsen, State Court Protection of Reproductive Rights: The Past, the Perils, and the Promise, 29 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 41, 61–62 (2015). 
222. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881–84 (1992). 
223. See, e.g., Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Wis. 1997), aff’d in part and rev’d in 
part, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999). 
224. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014) (striking down sonogram provision); 
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012) (up-
holding a more circumspectly-enacted provision); Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. 
Iowa Bd. of Med., 865 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 2015). 
225. See, e.g., Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1998); Planned
Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 24 (Tenn. 2000) (striking down law 
providing for forty-eight-hour waiting period because the court felt that the emergency ex-
ception was not broad enough). See generally Christine L. Raffaele, Annotation, Validity of 
State ‘Informed Consent’ Statutes by Which Providers of Abortions Are Required to Provide Patient 
Seeking Abortion With Certain Information, 119 A.L.R. 5th 315 (2016). 
226. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302–03 (1980); see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) 
(holding that federal funding could be limited to medically necessary abortions). 
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equal-protection and due-process clauses expansively to prohibit fund-
ing discrimination of any sort as to abortion,227 and a handful of courts 
have reached the same result through invocation of state right-to-pri-
vacy, ERA, and public-safety clauses.228  Other courts have rejected such 
challenges.229
Several early TRAP laws, including efforts to limit abortion-related 
services by non-physicians and to impose extensive certification re-
quirements on physicians performing abortions, had hard going in the 
courts: they were struck down on the ground that they added little or 
no margin of safety to abortion procedures and could only be viewed as 
efforts to restrict abortion.230  After anti-abortion forces made large gains 
in state legislatures in the 2010 election, they turned their attention to 
hospital-equivalency laws requiring abortion providers to have admit-
ting privileges at a nearby hospital and requiring abortion clinics to pro-
vide the same staff and facilities required of full-service ambulatory sur-
gical centers.  The hospital-equivalency laws have had bite: they have 
produced a sharp decline in the number of abortion clinics and provid-
ers nationwide and have limited access for many American women.231
227. See State Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 28 P.3d 
904 (Alaska 2001); Simat Corp. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 56 P.3d 28 (Ariz. 
2002); Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981); Moe v. Sec’y of 
Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981); Women v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1995); 
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982); Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Dep’t of 
Human Res., 663 P.2d 1247 (Or. Ct. App. 1983), aff’d on other grounds, 687 P.2d 785 (Or. 1984); 
see also Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986). 
228. See, e.g., Simat Corp., 56 P.3d 28; Myers, 625 P.2d 779; Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17; see also 
Maher, 515 A.2d 134; Women’s Health Ctr. of W.V., Inc. v. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658 (W. Va. 
1993).
229. See, e.g., Humphreys v. Clinic for Women, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 247 (Ind. 2003); Doe v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 487 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 1992); Fischer v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 
114 (Pa. 1985); Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex., 95 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. 2002).  See generally
Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Validity of State Statutes and Regulations Limiting or Re-
stricting Public Funding for Abortion Sought by Indigent Women, 118 A.L.R. 5th 463 (2016).
230. See, e.g., Christensen v. Wis. Med. Bd., 551 F. Supp. 565, 569 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (indi-
cating that a Medical Board regulation requiring that second-trimester abortions be per-
formed in surgical hospitals except in an emergency was presumptively unconstitutional);
Women’s Med. Ctr. of Providence, Inc. v. Cannon, 463 F. Supp. 531 (D.R.I. 1978); State v. 
Presidential Women’s Ctr., 884 So. 2d 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Planned Parenthood of 
Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000).  Several decisions striking down anti-
abortion laws have generated substantial backlash.  See also Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in 
the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politiciza-
tion, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1144–46 (1997). 
231. See Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1509–15 
(2012); Manian, supra note 212, 101–14. 
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The hospital-equivalency laws have roused abortion-rights supporters 
and have raised the question: how far can such requirements be ex-
tended before they cross Casey’s “undue burden” threshold? 
The leading test cases for hospital-equivalency laws originated in 
Wisconsin and Texas.  In 2013 both states enacted laws requiring abor-
tion providers to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty 
miles of their practice location;232 opponents challenged the laws as a 
violation of patients’ and abortion providers’ due-process rights and of 
the right of privacy implied in the federal due-process clause.233 Federal 
judges in both states conducted trials designed, like the Perry trial, to 
allow a full airing of whether the laws genuinely promoted public 
health and safety or served only to limit otherwise-legal abortions.  Wis-
consin federal judge William Conley concluded that the Wisconsin 
law’s primary purpose was to restrict access to abortion and struck it 
down, and a divided appeals court agreed.234 A Texas district judge con-
cluded that Texas’s law imposed an undue burden, particularly in that 
it would require some Texas women to travel hundreds of miles to reach 
a compliant abortion facility; Texas’s federal appeals court disagreed in 
part but in 2016 the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the district judge.235
Wisconsin has been solidly in the mainstream of the movement to-
ward restrictive abortion laws.  The state enacted several restrictive laws 
prior to Casey, including a law prohibiting abortion after fetal viability 
(1985);236 a detailed informed-consent law (1985);237 and a law requiring 
parental consent to a minor’s abortion (1991).238  All of Wisconsin’s pre-
Casey laws created exceptions where the restrictions would endanger 
the mother’s life or health or where, because of family tensions or for 
other reasons, parental consent was not practicable.239  In Karlin v. Foust
232. 2013 Wis. Act 37; 2013 Act of July 12, 2013, 83rd Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 1, 2013 Tex. Sess. 
Law Serv. 4795, 4795–802 (West) (codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.0031, 
171.041–048, 171.061–064, amending 245.010–011 (West 2015); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. amend-
ing §§ 164.052, 055 (West 2015)). 
233. Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673 (W.D. Tex. 2014), rev’d in part,
790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir.), rev’d, 579 U.S. —, Slip. Op., Docket No. 15-274 (June 27, 2016); Planned 
Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949 (W.D. Wis. 2015), aff’d, 806 F.3d 
908 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2841 (2015). 
234. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949. 
235. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673. 
236. 1985 Wis. Act 56. 
237. Id.
238. 1991 Wis. Act 263. 
239. See supra notes 237–38. 
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(1997), Judge Crabb upheld most parts of the 1985 informed-consent law 
except for provisions requiring abortion providers to inform patients of 
the availability of services for listening to the fetal heartbeat and requir-
ing providers to pay for informational materials; on appeal, the heart-
beat-information provision was also upheld.240  The legislature became 
more active after Casey: in 1996 and 1997 it established a twenty-four-
hour waiting period,241 expanded the informed-consent law,242 prohib-
ited partial-birth abortion,243 and prohibited state funding of abortions 
without exception.244  The 1996–97 laws drew challenges but all sur-
vived except the partial-birth abortion law, which was struck down be-
cause it also prohibited an abortion method that was more commonly 
used and thus deemed more essential.245  Abortion providers were also 
allowed to omit information if, in their judgment, providing that infor-
mation would jeopardize the mother’s health.246 After a period of stale-
mate (2003–10) during which a Democratic governor repeatedly vetoed 
anti-abortion measures, Republicans gained control of the legislature 
and the governorship in the 2010 election and initiated a new series of 
restrictive laws, the centerpiece of which was the 2013 hospital-equiva-
lency law previously discussed.247
VI. COURTS IN THE AGE OF EXPRESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM
A. The Erosion of Consensus 
Expressive individualism also permeated the institutional structure 
of American state courts.  Prior to 1960, dissent in state supreme court 
240. Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177, 1217–18, 1224–26 (W.D. Wis. 1997), aff’d in part 
and rev’d in part, 188 F.3d 446, 491–93 (7th Cir. 1999). 
241. 1995 Wis. Act 309. 
242. Id.
243. 1997 Wis. Act 219.  The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently held that states could 
prohibit partial-birth abortions, although it indicated it might hold such prohibitions uncon-
stitutional under some circumstances. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
244. 1995 Wis. Act 27. 
245. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998). 
246. Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Wis. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 188 
F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 1999) (waiting period and informational requirements); Doyle, 162 F.3d 463 
(striking down law banning partial-birth abortion because it provided no emergency excep-
tion and also extended to other types of abortion). See Carolyn Bower, Annotation, Validity, 
Construction, and Application of Statutory Restrictions on Partial Birth Abortions, 76 A.L.R. 5th
637 (2000; updated 2016). 
247. See supra notes 232 and accompanying text. 
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decisions was far from unknown but consensus was the clear norm.  
This was due in part to the heavy caseloads borne by supreme courts in 
the many states that lacked intermediate appellate courts.  Most cases 
were routine and decisions had to be turned out in quantity.248  There 
was little time available for lengthy opinions elaborating judicial differ-
ences of view; such opinions were reserved only for the most important 
and controversial cases. There were also cultural constraints: consensus 
and collegiality were valued in a society that placed communitarian 
bounds on acceptable concepts of liberty and conduct, and particularly 
by a mid-20th century legal culture that placed a premium on legal uni-
formity.249 
 
248. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued 284 decisions in 1940; 181 in 
1980; 87 in 2000; and 68 in 2010.  North Carolina’s supreme court issued 420 decisions in 1940 
and 57 in 2010; New York’s highest court issued 608 decisions in 1940 and 186 in 2010; Cali-
fornia’s supreme court issued 163 decisions in 1940 and 109 in 2010.  The Wisconsin and 
North Carolina drops can be explained in part by the fact that each state created an interme-
diate court of appeals in the late 20th century (North Carolina in 1967 and Wisconsin in 1977), 
but that factor does not explain the drops in New York and California (which created inter-
mediate courts of appeals in 1896 and 1904 respectively).  The figures were compiled from 
each court’s case reports for the years in question and are on file with the author.  New York’s 
and California’s highest courts were chosen for study because they are commonly considered 
to be among the most influential state courts of the period.  North Carolina’s court was chosen 
because it is a leading court from a different region of the country. 
249. See supra notes 5–6, 18–26 and accompanying text. 
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Consensus began eroding in many states during the late 20th cen-
tury.  Patterns of erosion differed, as illustrated by results for four sam-
ple states shown in the graph above.250  California’s consensus rate 
plunged earlier and more rapidly than that of other states due largely to 
divisions among its justices over the death penalty and criminal proce-
dural rights.  A catharsis was reached in 1986 when voters removed 
three justices perceived as too liberal on those issues, and thereafter the 
court was more cautious about showing open division.251  In other states 
such as New York and North Carolina, consensus did not begin to drop 
until the 21st century when political polarization began to increase rap-
idly throughout the nation.252  Wisconsin’s consensus rate has plunged 
more deeply and steadily than that of the other states, although a na-
tional survey conducted in 2003 suggests that Wisconsin’s supreme 
court is not the most divided: in that year, unanimity rates ranged from 
97.9% (Oregon) to 21.1% (Mississippi), with a median rate of 74%.253
Dissent has not been confined to individual judges: by 2010, half of all 
Wisconsin cases elicited dissents from two or more justices.254
250. The figures were compiled from each court’s case reports for 1940, 1960, 1980, 2000, 
and 2010 and are on file with the author. 
251. Uelmen, supra note 230, at 1136–39. 
252. Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RESEARCH CTR., www.people-press-
org./2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american/public/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017); 
RED AND BLUE NATION? CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED POLITICS,
supra note 26, at 1–48, 119–222; Craig Gilbert, The Red, the Blue: Political Polarization Through 
the Prism of Metropolitan Milwaukee, MARQ. LAW., Fall 2014, at 9. 
253. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reversal, Dissent, and Variability in State 
Supreme Courts: The Centrality of Jurisdictional Source, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1451, 1483–84 (2009).  
Wisconsin’s unanimity rate that year was 50.5%.  Id.
254. The figures were compiled from the Wisconsin case reports for 1940, 1960, 1980, 
2000, and 2010 and are on file with the author. 
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Judicial intemperance has grown as consensus has eroded.  Dissent-
ing justices have felt increasingly free to vent their feelings about the 
consequences of their colleagues’ decisions and to find personal as well 
as logical fault with their opponents, and prevailing justices have re-
sponded in kind.255  Not surprisingly Wisconsin, a leader in the trend 
away from consensus, has also provided conspicuous examples of the 
trend toward vitriol.  The 1992 Davis case, in which members of the ma-
jority denounced opponents of school vouchers as enablers of MPS’s 
failure and were in turn denounced for “judicially indefensible” behav-
ior and charged with enabling an effort to “subvert” the state’s educa-
tional system, was an early example.256 Heated rhetoric also became 
 
255. See, e.g., Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, ¶ 51, 358 Wis. 2d 1, 851 
N.W.2d 337 (“The dissent sidesteps this fact by asserting there is a constitutional right to 
organize in a collective bargaining unit, but leaves unanswered whether the employees are 
associating for the purpose of engaging in an expressive activity accorded First Amendment 
protection.”); id. ¶ 189 (“By twisting the definition of benefits to exclude pension contribu-
tions, the majority thereby avoids any substantive analysis of the Contract Clause.”) (Bradley, 
J., dissenting). 
256. See supra notes 12–17 and accompanying text.  The 2000 Vincent school-financing 
case provided another example.  Justice Diane Sykes tempered her dissent but expressed her 
feelings more bluntly after leaving the court to become a federal appellate judge.  In a 2006 
law review article she charged the court with lacking “‘modesty’ and ‘restraint’—the watch-
words of today’s judicial mainstream” and of “manifest[ing] a cavalier, almost dismissive 
attitude” toward precedent.” Diane S. Sykes, Reflections on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 89 
MARQ. L. REV. 723, 737 (2006) [hereinafter Sykes, Reflections].  Later, with fervor unabated, 
she argued that the Vincent court had “made up” the constitutional right to adequate funding 
and had exposed the “new federalism” as mere “intellectual cover for state judges to embed 
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more common in cases in other states, particularly in high-profile cases.  
The early gay-marriage cases provided several examples.  A majority of 
Connecticut’s justices, unwilling to limit themselves to a legal affirma-
tion of the right of gay marriage, suggested that opposition to gay mar-
riage was analogous to earlier opposition to interracial marriage.257  One 
dissenter protested that “[i]t is simply unfair to conflate opposition to 
same sex marriage with bigotry”258 and that democracy “is destroyed if 
the smug assurances of each age are removed from the democratic pro-
cess and written into the Constitution.”259  Washington’s supreme court 
generated similar heat in upholding its state’s DOMA: a dissenter criti-
cized the majority for “condon[ing] blatant discrimination against 
Washington’s gay and lesbian citizens” and using “excuse[s]” to “per-
petuate the existence of an unconstitutional and unjust law,”260 and the 
majority retorted that her position was “astonishing.”261
Regrettably, Wisconsin’s supreme court continued to be a leader in 
the march toward dissensus and vitriol.  A series of closely-divided de-
cisions addressing ethics charges against several of its members and the 
validity of several highly controversial measures enacted after Republi-
cans won the 2010 state election elicited regular heated exchanges.262  In 
2011 rising tensions led to a physical altercation between two justices, 
which resulted in substantial negative publicity for the court and disci-
plinary charges against one of the justices, which died after the court 
deadlocked over them.263
their policy preferences into state constitutional law.” Diane S. Sykes, The ‘New Federalism’: 
Confessions of a Former State Supreme Court Justice, 38 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 367, 381, 390 (2013) 
[hereinafter Sykes, The ‘New Federalism’].
257. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 454–58, 481 (Conn. 2008). 
258. Id. at 494 (Zarella, J., dissenting). 
259. Id. at 526 (Zarella, J., dissenting). 
260. Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 1012–13 (Wash. 2006). 
261. Id. at 979. 
262. See, e.g., Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, 358 Wis. 2d 1, 851 N.W.2d 
337 (upholding 2011 act restricting public employees’ collective bargaining rights); Milwau-
kee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, 2014 WI 98, 357 Wis. 2d 469, 851 N.W.2d 262 (upholding 
2013 voter-ID law); see also League of Women Voters v. Walker, 2014 WI 97, 357 Wis. 2d 360, 
851 N.W.2d 302 (same). 
263. Dee J. Hall, Gableman Says He Had Date Wrong in Account of Alleged Bradley Head-
Smack, WIS. STATE J., Sept. 2, 2011; Sandy Cullen, Sheriff’s Report Shows Dysfunction in, Pressure 
on Supreme Court, WIS. STATE J., Aug. 26, 2011. 
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B. The New Federalism 
Elements of expressive individualism also surfaced in the judicial 
“new federalism” movement.  From roughly 1925 to 1970 the U.S. Su-
preme Court actively expanded the scope of civil and criminal proce-
dural rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, particularly during 
Chief Justice Earl Warren’s tenure (1953–69), but after Warren’s retire-
ment there was concern that the high Court would trim back its recent 
rights extensions.264  In 1977 Warren’s colleague William Brennan sug-
gested in a widely-read article that state supreme courts could meet that 
risk by looking to their own constitutions as sources of criminal and civil 
rights broader than those conferred by the federal Constitution.265  The 
new judicial federalism did not originate with Brennan—in People v. An-
derson (1972), California’s supreme court had struck down existing 
death penalty laws by interpreting its state’s constitutional clause 
against cruel and unusual punishment more broadly than the clause’s 
federal counterpart266—but Brennan’s article attracted national atten-
tion and elicited support from several prominent state judges, most no-
tably California’s Stanley Mosk, Oregon’s Hans Linde and Wisconsin’s 
Shirley Abrahamson.267  Linde took an openly activist position, arguing 
that state courts should affirmatively seek to give their states’ bills of 
rights a broader scope than the federal Bill of Rights.268  Mosk was nearly 
as enthusiastic,269 but Abrahamson was more cautious.  She felt that the 
new federalism could be useful in shoring up civil and criminal proce-
dural rights but that unbridled use could lead to unintended conse-
264. See, e.g., ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 914–1064 (4th ed. 1970); William J. Brennan, 
Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
265. Brennan, supra note 264; see Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Consti-
tutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1147–50 (1985). 
266. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972). 
267. See Shirley Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951 (1982); Hans 
A. Linde, Without ‘Due Process’: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125 (1970); Stan-
ley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1081 (1985). 
268. Linde, supra note 267; see G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097 (1997). 
269. See Mosk, supra note 267; Stanley Mosk, States’ Rights—And Wrongs, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 552, 561 (1997).  New Jersey’s supreme court has also been active in the new federalism 
movement. See Marie L. Garibaldi, The Rehnquist Court and State Constitutional Law, 34 TULSA
L.J. 67, 81–82 (1998); Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental 
Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707 (1983); Deborah T. Poritz, The New Jersey Supreme Court: A 
Leadership Court in Individual Rights, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 705 (2007). 
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quences in other areas, for example, unwarranted expansion of govern-
ment’s eminent domain powers, and could also lead to problems asso-
ciated with lack of national uniformity.270  In Abrahamson’s view, 
“[b]oth the proponents and critics of the new judicial federalism should 
be careful what they wish for.”271
Most state courts gave at least lip service to the new federalism: to 
renounce it would have meant giving up the right to interpret their own 
constitutions independently of the federal constitution, which they were 
not willing to do.  Actual application of the doctrine was another matter, 
however.  Use of the doctrine sometimes led to backlash: several courts 
followed California’s lead in interpreting their constitutions’ bills of 
rights to prohibit the death penalty,272 but voters in California and four 
other states eventually approved constitutional amendments overturn-
ing such decisions and in 1986 California voters turned three justices out 
of office based on a perception that the justices were “soft” on crime and 
had bent the state constitution to fit their views.273
Abortion rights and gay marriage also put a spotlight on the new 
federalism.  After the Supreme Court held that the federal equal-protec-
tion clauses did not compel Congress or the states to cover abortion in 
publicly-funded health programs, at least thirteen state courts held that 
their constitutions did require such coverage,274 and several state courts 
held that their constitutions prohibited other abortion restrictions that 
would have passed constitutional muster under Casey.275  Gay-marriage 
advocates initially put state constitutions at center stage because of con-
cerns that the Supreme Court would not find a right of gay marriage in 
270. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, State Constitutional Law, New Judicial Federalism, and the 
Rehnquist Court, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 339, 349 (2004). 
271. Id.; see Abrahamson, supra note 267; Garibaldi, supra note 269, at 81–82. 
272. See Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984); Dist. Attorney for 
Suffolk Cty. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980); State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229 (Neb. 
2008); State v. Gerald, 549 A.2d 792 (N.J. 1988); People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004); 
State v. Quinn, 623 P.2d 630 (Or. 1981). 
273. See CAL. CONST., art. I, § 17 (1972); FLA. CONST., art. I, § 17 (1998); MASS. CONST.,
art. XXVI (1982); OR. CONST., art. I, § 40 (1984); N.J. CONST., art. I, § 12 (1992); Kenneth P. 
Miller, Defining Rights in the States: Judicial Activism and Popular Response, 76 ALB. L. REV. 2061, 
2070–71, 2080–83 (2013); Uelmen, supra note 230, at 1136–39. 
274. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1977); Miller, supra note 273, at 2074–75, nn.102–14. 
275. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997) (parental-
notice statute struck down on state right-of-privacy grounds); Planned Parenthood of Cent. 
N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620 (N.J. 2000) (same); N. Fla. Women’s Health & Counseling Servs., 
Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003) (same); Miller, supra note 273, at 2074–75. 
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the federal Constitution, and each of the pioneering gay-marriage 
cases—Baehr (1993), Baker (1999), and Goodridge (2003)—relied on state 
and not federal constitutional provisions.276  In Baker, Vermont’s su-
preme court supported its decision with an extensive discussion of the 
state’s “common benefits” clause and its distinctive concept of liberty; 
the Goodridge majority did the same for Massachusetts’s equal-protec-
tion clause.277
The Wisconsin supreme court’s approach to the new federalism was 
understated but not untypical.  In State v. Doe (1977),278 decided shortly 
after Brennan’s article appeared, the court announced that it reserved 
the right to apply the new federalism in appropriate cases but in Doe
and in subsequent criminal-procedure cases the court generally fol-
lowed a “lockstep” approach, finding congruence between state and 
federal constitutional provisions notwithstanding Justice Abraham-
son’s advocacy of a more expansive view of state rights.279  In 2004–2005 
the court briefly returned to the new federalism, holding in two deci-
sions that Wisconsin’s constitution embodied a more expansive view of 
the right against self-incrimination than the federal Constitution.280
Those decisions attracted little public attention but raised the ire of Jus-
tice Diane Sykes, who subsequently charged that the court had “ex-
posed the ‘new federalism’ as mere “intellectual cover for state judges 
to embed their policy preferences into state constitutional law.”281  In 
recent years the court has returned to the lockstep approach, to the point 
where Justice Abrahamson has complained of its “persistent antipathy” 
to the doctrine, but it has not renounced the new federalism alto-
gether.282  Given the doctrine’s deep historical roots and its usefulness 
as a reserve instrument of state power, it is unlikely that any state will 
276. See supra notes 43–65 and accompanying text. 
277. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941, 953 (Mass. 2003). 
278. 78 Wis. 2d 161, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977). 
279. See, e.g., State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999) (right against self-
incrimination); State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 492 N.W.2d 311 (1992) (right to be free from 
double jeopardy for criminal offenses); State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 369 N.W.2d 145 
(1985) (same); Thompson v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 134, 265 N.W.2d 467 (1978) (right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure). 
280. State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 (Miranda warnings); 
State v. Dubose, 2006 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582 (lineups). 
281. Sykes, The ‘New Federalism,’ supra note 256, at 381, 390. 
282. State v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶ 87, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592 (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring).
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ever renounce the doctrine altogether.283
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial individualism achieved an apotheosis of sorts in early 2015 
when Wisconsin voters narrowly ratified a constitutional amendment 
changing the method of selecting the state’s chief justice.  The old 
method, which had automatically assigned the position to the court’s 
senior justice, had been enacted in the 1870s as part of an effort to de-
crease partisanship in the judiciary.284  It had never attracted attention 
or controversy, and through it Shirley Abrahamson had ascended to the 
chief justiceship in 1996.  A sometime individualist (as in her advocacy 
of the new federalism), a sometime communitarian (as in her opposition 
to school vouchers), and almost always a forceful presence among her 
colleagues and the public, Abrahamson had led the court through one 
of its most turbulent periods and in some ways had become an emblem 
of that turbulence.285 After Republicans gained control of Wisconsin’s 
legislature in 2011 they conceived the amendment, which provided for 
election of the chief justice by the court’s members, as a means of giving 
the court’s conservative wing titular as well as de facto control of the 
court.286  In the process they replaced an automatic selection mechanism, 
enacted in a more communitarian age in order to reduce conflicts, with 
one that gave the court’s members a new means of expressing them-
selves.  After voters narrowly ratified the amendment in 2015,287 the 
court’s conservative wing immediately demoted Abrahamson and se-
lected one of its own members as chief justice by a 4-3 vote,288 an act that 
283. State v. Delebreau, 2015 WI 55, ¶ 82, 362 Wis. 2d 542, 864 N.W.2d 852 (Abrahamson, 
J., dissenting); Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶ 87 (Abrahamson, J., concurring); Sykes, The ‘New Feder-
alism’, supra note 256, at 390–93; Sykes, Reflections, supra note 256, at 737. 
284. J. Res. 10 (Wis. 1876); J. Res. 1 (Wis. 1877); 1877 Wis. Act 48; WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 4 
(amended 1877). 
285. See supra notes 11, 15–16, 267, 270–71, 280, 283, and accompanying text; THE YALE
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 11, at 1; Christian Schneider, Let
Wisconsin Supreme Court Justices Pick Their Own Chief, MILWAUKEE J.-SENTINEL, Dec. 10, 2013, 
www.jsonline/news/opinion/let-wisconsin-supreme-court-justices-pick-their-own-chief-
b9916014921-235327371.html.
286. Schneider, supra note 285. 
287. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (amended 2015); J. Res. 1, 102d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2015); 
J. Res. 2, 102d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2015).  The amendment passed by a 53% margin (433,533 
votes for, 384,503 against). 
288. See Scott Bauer, Patience Roggensack Elected Chief Justice; Shirley Abrahamson Says She 
Still Holds Post, WIS. ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2015), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-
and-politics/patience-roggensack-elected-chief-justice-shirley-abrahamson-says-she-
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elicited an unsuccessful court challenge from the former chief justice. 289
Justice Abrahamson continues as a member of the court, and the 
struggle between expressive individualism and opposing forces that her 
career and the American Age of Individualism have embodied also con-
tinues.  Will the struggle continue indefinitely, or will the nation’s in-
creasing economic and cultural diversification ultimately produce new 
frameworks of social and legal consensus that can accommodate and 
even celebrate those conflicting forces? 
The evolution of law in Wisconsin and other states during the Age 
of Individualism does not provide a clear answer to that question.  That 
is not surprising, for the law has not evolved in a neat linear pattern 
either within or across the states.  Take Wisconsin as an example: it was 
the first state to enact a law protecting its gay citizens from employment 
discrimination290 but it later attempted to block gay marriage through 
its DOMA and it joined the parade of courts blessing gay marriage rel-
atively late.291  Wisconsin pioneered school vouchers, an important and 
innovative form of expressive individualism,292 but it has not been a 
leader in other individualistic movements such as expansion of firearm, 
hunting, fishing, and gambling rights,293 and it has been more active 
than many states in the movement to restrict women’s ability to choose 
abortion, most notably through its recent and controversial hospital-
equivalency law.294  Wisconsin’s justices have consistently led the way 
in expressing judicial individualism through dissensus, but there are 
signs that the adverse publicity that dissensus produced between 2008 
and 2011 has encouraged the court to moderate its rhetoric if not the 
still/article_76ebef79-7e77-54de-823b-f4fb74f0895d.html [https://perma.cc/B7RA-3KZZ].  
Abrahamson was in good company: in New York’s 1821 constitutional convention political 
opponents of Chancellor James Kent, a seminal figure in early American state law and per-
haps the greatest American state judge, inserted a provision requiring all judges to retire at 
age sixty, thus forcing Kent from the bench two years later.  N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. V, § 3; 
JOHN THEODORE HORTON, JAMES KENT: A STUDY IN CONSERVATISM 1763–1847, at 249–50, 259–
61 (1939).  Kent and Abrahamson are the only two American judges who have elicited their 
own constitutional amendments. 
289. See Molly Beck, Shirley Abrahamson Drops Lawsuit to Regain Chief Justice Title, WIS.
ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2015), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/shirley-
abrahamson-drops-lawsuit-to-regain-chief-justice-title/article_12e46c97-7549-5b3c-a7d0-
8d748b4a4d75.html [https://perma.cc/E2MB-C4ZB]. 
290. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
291. See supra notes 65, 85–86 and accompanying text. 
292. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
293. See supra notes 104, 111, 124–25, and accompanying text. 
294. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
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ideological divisions underlying that rhetoric. 295
The evolution of state law during the Age of Individualism does pro-
vide some clues to the future.  Expressive individualism has won some 
notable victories in the face of fierce opposition, and it has underscored 
the importance of state constitutions and of the new-federalism doctrine 
as vehicles for developing the law.  Prior to the 1960s civil rights advo-
cates relied heavily on the federal Constitution and federal courts as the 
most promising forums for expanding rights296 but the gay-marriage ex-
perience;297 the proliferation of state constitutional amendments ex-
panding individual rights;298 the reciprocal efforts to use state amend-
ments, particularly DOMAs and English-only amendments, to cabin 
expressive individualism;299 the pivotal role that state constitutions are 
playing in the resolution of the legality of voucher programs;300 and the 
less-pivotal but nonetheless important role that state bills of rights have 
played in delineating the constitutional limits of abortion restriction,301
suggest that state constitutions and courts have moved to the forefront 
and will remain there as the Age of Individualism goes forward.  Given 
the active role that Wisconsin’s lawmakers and judges have played at 
many parts of the battlefield, it is a good bet that in the coming years 
they will be found in the lead on at least some parts of that field. 
295. See supra notes 256, 263, and accompanying text. 
296. See KELLY & HARBISON, supra note 264, at 913–1063; Brennan, supra note 265. 
297. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra notes 103–04, 110–12, 120–22, and accompanying text. 
299. See supra notes 126–49 and accompanying text. 
300. See supra notes 155–204 and accompanying text. 
301. See supra notes 205–47 and accompanying text. 
39285-m
qt_100-3 Sheet No. 153 Side B      06/19/2017   09:53:44
39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 153 Side B      06/19/2017   09:53:44
C M
Y K
*    *    * 
 
 
